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INTRODUCTION

Former Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. recently charged that the Soviet Union had used chemical weapons,
including poisonous gas, to cause the death of over 3,000 Afghanistan citizens from 1979 to 1981.1 Following this accusation, the
1. Halloran, U.S. Accuses Soviet of Poisoning 3,000, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1982, at Al, col. 1 (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
The charge was based upon information received from Soviet-trained Afghan
Army defectors, Afghan refugees in Pakistan, doctors who had treated victims of
the chemical weapons attacks, survivors of attacks, and journalists covering Afghanistan. Id. at A9, col. 1. Deputy Secretary Stoessel testified that State Department analysis of the information indicated that several different agents, including irritants, incapacitants, lethal nerve gas, phosgene, mustard gas, toxic
smoke, lewisite, and possibly mycotoxins have been used. Id. The Soviet Government responded by calling the charge "a lie." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1982, at
A5, col. 2.
In his address to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament
on June 17, 1982, President Reagan charged the Soviet Union and its allies with
violation of "the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law, and
the 1972 biological weapons convention." Id., June 18, 1982, at A16, col. 4. The
President alleged that "the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in
Laos and Kampuchea and are themselves using chemical weapons against
freedom fighters in Afghanistan." Id. The President prefaced this charge with
the following observation: "The need for a truly effective and verifiable chemical
weapons agreement has been highlighted by recent events." Id. President Reagan continued, after his allegations:
We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government as well as to
the Governments of Laos and Vietnam their use of chemical and toxin
weapons.
We call upon them now to grant full and free access to their countries or
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Department of State released a report charging that the Soviet
Union's use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, and Laos violated both treaties and established principles of international law.2 On December 20, 1982, the "Tribunal
of the Peoples, in its second Session of Afghanistan, condemned
'3
the Soviet Union for violations of the established rules of war."
This condemnation was based in part on the use of chemical
weapons against Afghans since 1979. The evidence included a film
taken by Dutch journalist Bernd de Bruin showing a chemical attack on an Afghan village.4 On January 24, 1983, a spokesman for
the French Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that the French government had evidence supporting claims that the Soviet Union
was conducting chemical warfare in Southeast Asia. These
charges are the latest developments in a growing effort to confirm
the reported use of chemical or biological weapons (CBWs) in
Asia.
In 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig revealed that the
State Department had obtained physical evidence from Southeast

to territories they control so that United Nations experts can conduct an
effective independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors.
Evidence of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements underscores the need to approach negotiation of any agreements with care.
Id.
2. Hilts, New Report on Chemical War, Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1982, at
1, col. 4. The report avers that since 1975, Soviet forces have supervised Laotian
and Vietnamese forces in the use of lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Laos,
that Vietnamese forces have used lethal chemical and toxin weapons in
Kampuchea, and that Soviet forces have used a number of lethal chemical weapons, including nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the 1979 invasion. Id. at 6, col.
1. The report was based upon substantiated reports of attacks, refugee interviews, journalists' reports, intelligence information, and victims' autopsies. Id.
For a more complete report, see Taubman, U.S. Offers Report to Show Soviet
Use of Chemical War, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, at Al, col. 4; Excerpts from
State Department Report on Chemical Warfare, id. at A14, col. 1. The official
Soviet news agency, Tass, characterized the charges as "dirty lies." Id. at Al,
col. 4.
3. Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 3. The Tribunal of the Peoples is the
successor to the Bertrand Russell war crimes tribunal, which has generally focused its attacks on the West. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id., at 26, col. 6. The official French report has not been made public but
is reportedly based on biological specimens from the Thailand-Kampuchea border. Id.
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Asia confirming the presence of high levels of three mycotoxins,
all of which are poisonous to humans and animals but none of
which are indigenous to Southeast Asia.7 Secretary Haig declared:
"The use in war of such toxins is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and related rules of customary international law; their
very manufacture for such purposes is strictly forbidden by the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention."8 Richard Burt, Director of
the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, went
further than Haig or Stoessel in attributing responsibility for the
attacks. 9 Burt asserted that the Soviet Union was "directly involved" in the use of chemical weapons (CWs) in Afghanistan and
that armed forces of the governments of Laos, Kampuchea, and

Vietnam10 were deploying CWs in Kampuchea and Laos.11 He
further asserted that the Soviet Union was involved with the use

of CWs in Southeast Asia. 12 Burt concluded that the use of these
6. Crossette, U.S. Presents an Analysis to Back Its Charge of Toxin Weapons' Use, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1981, at Al, col. 1. Toxins are "poisonous prod-

ucts of pathogenic . . . bacteria."

BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY

1337 (5th 1979).

Mycotoxins are produced by fungi. Sullivan, Toxin Is Called a Pillar of Soviet
Arsenal, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1981, at A8, col. 4.
7. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1981, at A6,col. 3; Id., Sept. 14, 1981, at A8, col. 3.
8. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at A8, col. 3. The Soviet, Vietnamese, and
Laotian governments denied that chemical agents were being used in Southeast
Asia. Crossette, supra note 3, at A7, col..6; Burns, Moscow Says Toxin Charge
Made by Haig Was a 'Big Lie,' N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1981, at A8, col. 5.
9. 'Yellow Rain' and Other Forms of Chemical and Biological Warfare in
Asia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, International
Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981) (statement of Richard Burt, Director, Bur. of PoliticoMilitary Affairs, U.S. State Dep't). [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing]; see
also Shribman, U.S. Finds Chemical Warfare Toxins in Indochina, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1981, at A8, col. 4 (claiming discovery of a "smoking gun").
10. Secretary of State Haig had observed in his Berlin speech of September
13, 1981, that "Vietnam ... has seized Kampuchea and now threatens the
peace of Southeast Asia." N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at A8, col. 2. The
Vietnamese Government's armed forces have been linked to deployment of
chemical weapons in Laos and Kampuchea. See Use of Chemical Agents in
Southeast Asia Since the Vietnam War: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. passim (1979) [hereinafter cited as House Hearing];N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 1982, at A9, col. 2.
11. Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 17.
12. Id. Burt listed reasons why "the links to the Soviet Union are strong":
The Soviets are providing extensive military assistance and advice in
Laos, Kampuchea, and to the Vietnamese forces fighting there. The Sovi-
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toxins in Asia violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biolog13
ical Weapons Convention, and customary international law.
Reports of CBW use in Asia led United States Government officials to conclude that various agents, lethal and nonlethal, are being used against resistance groups in Afghanistan, Kampuchea,
and Laos. 14 Refugees from Laos who were victims of what is
known as "yellow rain' ' 1L have reported violent itching, headaches, tearing and swelling of the eyes, difficulty in breathing, se-

ets certainly know what is happening and are in a position to stop it if
they chose.
The Soviets are advising and controlling chemical warfare activity in

Southeast Asia. Soviet chemical experts have inspected a number of chemical weapons storage facilities there. Both lethal and nonlethal chemicals

are believed to be stored at these sites and are transported between storage facilities and ordinance camps or field use areas as needed.
There exist, insofar as we are aware, no facilities in Southeast Asia capable of producing the mold and extracting the mycotoxins in the quantities
in which they are being used. Such facilities do exist in the Soviet Union,
including microbiological plants, under military control and with heavy
military guard.
The Soviets have resisted every effort to mount an impartial investigation of chemical weapons use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.
Id. Burt also testified that some attacks were reportedly conducted by Soviet
biplanes used as crop dusters. Id. at 13. These attacks released colored clouds of
particles, often yellow, which victims and witnesses called "yellow rain." Id.
13. Id. at 17. The Soviets denied the charge that they or the governments
they support in Southeast Asia were using lethal CWs. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1981, at A3, col. 3.
14. See Senate Hearing,supra note 9, at 14-15; House Hearing, supra note
10, passim;OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FINAL REPORT
OF THE DASG INVESTIGATrIVE TEAM: USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST THE
HMONG IN LAOS 3, 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DASG REPORT]; Halloran, supra
note 1.
Senator Dan Quayle of Indiana reported having information that Soviet medical personnel have been seen at combat locations administering antidotes to survivors and performing autopsies on some of those not so fortunate. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1982, at A22, col. 3 (Letter to Editor). Data gleaned by intelligence
agencies has indicated that about 10,000 people-6,000 Laotians, 3,000 Afghans,
and 1,000 Cambodians-have been killed by various chemical weapons in Asia.
Gwertzman, U.S. Prepares Report on Chemical Warfare Deaths, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 18, 1982, at A8, col. 1. The State Department reported that blood and
urine samples from four victims of an attack on February 13, 1982, by
Vietnamese forces on Kampuchean guerrillas indicated "high levels of toxin exposure." Weinraub, U.S. Cites Evidence on Chemical War, N.Y. Times, May 14,
1982, at A7, col. 1. Mycotoxins were identified as one agent. Id.
15. See supra note 12.
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vere nausea, uncontrollable vomiting of blood, diarrhea, blisters
on the skin, hemorrhaging from mucous membranes and bodily
orifices, and convulsions.1" Those directly exposed to the agents
died shortly thereafter, often within one hour. Those not directly
exposed suffered similar symptoms in lesser degrees of severity,
but for longer periods
of time and often died after several days of
17
intense suffering.

Much of the CBW use has been directed at the Hmong tribes,
mountain people who sided with the French and the United
States during their respective conflicts in Southeast Asia."" Thus,
revenge has been suggested as a motive for an apparent attempt
to exterminate the Hmong.1 9
It is apparent that CBWs20 have been used in Asia.2" This Note
16. For in-depth coverage of victim symptomology, see DASG REPORT, supra
note 14. See also Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 14; House Hearing,supra
note 10, at 17-18 (statement of Tou Yi Vang, Hmong refugee).
17. House Hearing,supra note 10, at 7 (statement of Rep. Leach).
18. Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Leach).
19. Id.; see also id. at 7-8 (drawing a parallel between this effort and Hitler's
attempt to exterminate the Jewish race); Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 22, col. 3.
20. United States government officials have tended to include toxins in the
category of "chemical weapons." See Halloran, supra note 1, at Al, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at Al, col. 5. Because toxins are chemical products of
micro-organisms, see supra note 6, they. are generally classified as biological
agents. A.V. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., 2 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGIcAL WEAPONS 2 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as THOMAS & THOMAS]; Brungs, The Status of Biological Warfare In InternationalLaw, 24 Mm. L. REV. 1, 47, 58-59 (1964); Neinast, United
States Use of Biological Warfare, id. at 14.
21. For more complete treatment and development of the facts and allegations, see THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE FOR FY 1982, 107 (1982); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, REPORTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN, LAOS, AND KAMPUCHEA

(June 1980) (referred to as the "Compendium"); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE,
UPDATE TO THE COMPENDIUM ON THE REPORTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

(Mar. 1980); 127 CONG. REC. 9021-22 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1981) (statement of Rep.
Leach); NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1981, at 44.
Private investigative journalism has done much to bring the issue to light. One
of the most comprehensive of these investigations is S. SEAGRAVE, YELLOW RAIN
(1981). An independent investigation by ABC News resulted in "Rain of Terror"
aired on the evening of December 21, 1981. See also Phillips, Moscow's Poison
War: Mounting Evidence of Battlefield Atrocities, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 5, 1982; Rothwell, Yellow Rain Over Laos, AM. SPECTATOR, Jan.
1982, at 7; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Legacy from Laos, READER'S DIGEST, Aug.

1981, at 96.
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undertakes an examination of legal responsibility for the use of
CBWs by positing a hypothetical case brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by the United States on behalf of
resistance groups in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos 22 against

the governments of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and
Laos. The allegations are those detailed above, namely, (1) the
Soviet Union is employing lethal or seriously injurious CBWs
against Afghan resistance groups; (2) the Soviet Union is supplying and assisting the armed forces of Vietnam, Laos, and
Kampuchea in their use of lethal or seriously injurious CBWs
against resistance groups in Laos and Kampuchea; and (3) the

Laotian

government,

with

the

assistance

of Soviet

and

Vietnamese armed forces, is employing CBWs in an extermination campaign against the Hmong tribes in Laos.
The issues to be resolved are (1) whether the parties to this
case have violated binding agreements that prohibit the use of

lethal or seriously injurious chemical and biological weapons in
warfare; (2) whether the parties have violated general principles

of international law, as distilled from treaties, custom, judicial decisions, and writings of international scholars; and (3) whether

The Wall Street Journal has persistently called attention to CBW use in Asia,
particularly through its "Yellow Rain" editorial series. See Yellow Rain: Gaining Speed, Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1982, at 26, col. 1; Kucewicz, Asian Refugees:
Death in the Night, id., Mar. 1, 1982, at 22, col. 3 (reporting the coincidental
nighttime deaths of many Hmong refugees in the United States and speculating
on a possible link with exposure to CBW agents; Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1982, at 31,
col. 1 (letter to the Editor from Richard Burt, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the U.S. Department of State); Wain, Yellow Rain: The
UN's 'PitifulFarce'.

.

., id. at col. 3; Leach,. . . And the Choices Now Facing

the U.S., id.; Denial, id., Dec. 30, 1981, at 6, col. 1; ABC's Deadly Evidence, id.,
Dec. 18, 1981, at 22, col. 1; Whitewashing Yellow Rain, id., Nov. 23, 1981, at 26,

col. 1; Anyone Serious?, id., Nov. 13, 1981, at 34, col. 1 ("Yellow Rain-I");
How Many Smoking Guns?, id., Nov. 3, 1981, at 34, col. 1 ("Yellow Rain-I").
See also NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 26; Klass, Lifting the Curtainon Afghanistan's Horror, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 3; Chemical Warfare Reported in Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1982, at A6, col. 3; U.S. Suspects
Afghans of Chemical Warfare, id., Aug. 11, 1982, at A5, col. 2; CanadaPrepares
Study On Asian Chemical War, id., June 21, 1982, at A7, col. 2; Lawyers Cite
Evidence of Chemical War In Asia, id., June 11, 1982, at A5, col. 5; Boffey,
Some Are Swayed On Chemical War, id., Mar. 28, 1982, at A15, col. 1; Boffey,
Man-Made Substances Found in 'Yellow Rain,' id., Dec. 18, 1981, at A12, col. 2.
22. "Only states may be parties in cases before the Court." Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 34(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 1 U.N.T.S.
at xvi.
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the aforementioned elements of law apply to the types of armed
conflicts occurring in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea.
This Note concludes that (1) the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and
the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 provide conventional
restraints upon the use of lethal or seriously injurious CBWs; (2)
modern treaties, customs, judicial decisions, and writings form a
public international law norm that imposes a legal restraint limiting the use of lethal or seriously injurious CBWs and binding all
states regardless of their acceptance of conventional prohibitions;
and (3) the law of war today is characterized more accurately as
the "law of armed conflict," because it must of necessity apply to
conflicts that are not purely interstate.
Before discussing international law as it applies to the instant
hypothetical case, however, this Note will examine conventions
and general international law concerning the use of CBWs.
II.

CONVENTIONAL RESTRAINTS
A. Introduction

In resolving a dispute, the ICJ initially refers to
"[i]nternational conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states."2 Because an international agreement need not incorporate established international law but may include provisions which
supplement, supersede, or derogate from existing international
law,2 4 a convention is primarily a source of international law only
for its signatories.2 5 This Note's examination of the major treaties
in the area of CBWs will emphasize the contractual obligations
undertaken by the signatories.2
Among the recent weapons conventions applicable today are
the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Protocol)2 7 and the 1972 Biological

23. Id. art. 38(1)(a).
24. See J. BRIERLY, THEi LAW OF NATIONS 57 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963); G.
HACKWORTH, 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1940).

25.
26.
tional
27.

J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 57.
For treatment of the major conventions as sources of general internalaw, see infra text accompanying notes 23-101.
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poison-

ous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]

reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS 110 (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds.
1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHINDLER & ToMAN].
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Weapons Convention (BWC).28 Earlier international agreements
were signed by a previous government of the Soviet Union, and
colonial mother countries of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Laos, and
Vietnam.2 9 Because the issues of state and government succession, although worthy of examination, are beyond the scope of
this Note, the later section on general international law will discuss the older, less widely accepted agreements.
B.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol

The signatories to the Geneva Protocol agree:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties
to which the majority of the Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a
part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations;
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already
Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition,
agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration....
The present Protocol will come into force for each Signatory Power
as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which
have already deposited their ratifications.""0
The Soviet Union and Vietnam are parties to the Protocol; Af-

28. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 [hereinafter cited as
BWC], reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 600 (T. Dupuy & G. Hammerman eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DuruY &
HAMMERMAN]. One hundred sixteen nations are party to the Geneva Protocol.
UNITED STATES DzE'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 289 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as TREATIES IN FORCE]. Eighty-eight nations are party to the BWC. Id. at 26566.
29. The Soviet Union has denied succession to pre-Revolution treaties.
O'Brien, infra note 108, at 18 n.43. Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam were colonized by France; Afghanistan was a colony of Great Britain.
30. Protocol, supra note 27, at 575.
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ghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos are not.3 1 The Soviets ratified
the Protocol in 1928 with the following reservation qualifying its
obligation:
(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the
U.S.S.R. as regards those Powers and States which have both
signed and ratified the Protocol or have finally acceded thereto.
(2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government
of the U.S.S.R. toward any Power at enmity with him whose armed
forces, or the armed forces of whose32 allies, fail to respect the
prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.
Vietnam recently acceded to the Protocol3 3 but maintained a similar reservation.3 4 The first part of the U.S.S.R.'s reservation
seems to reiterate the final "effectiveness" provision which makes
the Protocol binding only between the ratifying or "Contracting
parties." Thus, a ratifying party presumably would be free to
make first use of the prohibited weapons against any state not a
party to the Protocol. The second part of the reservation implies
that once the Protocol is violated by a signatory nation or the ally
of a signatory nation, even if the ally itself is not a party, the
Soviet Union may use any of the prohibited weapons against the
violator and its allies. The reservation thereby reduces the reserving party's obligation to the following: No first use of the prohibited weapons against other contracting parties, but only if the allies of these parties have complied with the Protocol.
First, the Protocol prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials,
or devices. '' 35 This terminology constitutes a broad proscription
and has been subject to varying interpretations.3 In the process

31. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 289.
32. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 119. A number of states ratified
the Protocol with similarly worded reservations, including the United Kingdom,
France, Australia, Chile, Israel, and Portugal. Id. at 115-19. See also 120 CONG.
REc. 40,023-24 (1974).
33. See SCHINDLER & Tott&N, supra note 27, at 111.
34. Telephone interview with an employee of the Treaty Office of the Department of State (Mar. 16, 1982).
35. Protocol, supra note 27, at 25.
36. These varying interpretations are due, in large part, to a disparity between the English and French texts of the Protocol. The French version prohibits "gaz asphyxiantes, toxiques oir similaires." Tucker, Weapons of Warfare, in
LAW AND RESPONSmmrrY IN WARFARE 165 (P. Trooboff ed. 1975). Thus, the En-

glish version can lead to a broad interpretation that prohibits all other gases,
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of interpreting a convention, the ICJ would likely "giv[e] effect to

the expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as
expressed in the words used by them in the light of the surround-

ing circumstances.

37

The ICJ might focus on the words "asphyxi-

ating" and "poisonous" in the Protocol. "Asphyxiating" means
"suffocating." 38 "Poisonous" is defined as having the property of

"chemically produc[ing] an injurious or deadly effect.

39

These

adjectives were included to encompass "first-generation chemical
agents that played such a large part in World War 1,"0 such as
phosgene, chlorine and mustard gas, and other choking, blistering, and vomit-inducing agents. 4 1 The Protocol's use of the word

and the French version can lead to a narrow interpretation that prohibits only
similar other gases. Id. The former interpretation could be the basis of an argument that the Protocol prohibits all lethal and nonlethal chemical agents. Id.
For further discussion on the debate arising from a comparison of the English
and French texts, see 3 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 47-48 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as 3 SIPRI]; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 75-76.
Much of the recent debate has focused on the legality, according to the Protocol, of using lethal antiplant or nonlethal antipersonnel agents, including tear
gas and herbicides. The United States argued for the narrower interpretation of
the Protocol to defend the United States use of herbicides and tear gas in Vietnan. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-

11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ACDA]; Tucker, supra,at 16566; see N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1971, at A3, col. 4. A discussion of nonlethal antipersonnel or lethal antiplant agents is beyond the scope of this Note. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see Levie, Weapons of Warfare, in LAw AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE 153-60 (P. Trooboff ed. 1975); Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 853
(1970); Moore, Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological
Warfare: A Legal and Political Analysis, 58 VA. L. REV. 419 (1972); Tucker,
supra, 161-72.
37. A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27,
1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969) ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.").
MENT AGREEMENTS

38. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 163-64 (2d ed. 1955).

39. Id. at 1905.
40.

S. SEAGRAVE, YELLOW RAN 37 (1981); see Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and

Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 375, 380-81
(The Protocol "symbolized the abhorrence for gas which even military men had
after World War I.").
41. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 1-3.
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"analogous 4' 2 extends the prohibition to include other poisonous
or asphyxiating liquids, materials, and devices. The proscription
also covers the use of "other gases," not asphyxiating or poisonous.43 There can be little doubt that this language proscribes the
4
use in war of all lethal or seriously injurious chemical agents."
Second, the Protocol forbids "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. '45 Bacteria are microorganisms, but not all microorganisms are bacterial. 46 Thus, a literal interpretation of this
proscription would not encompass microorganisms such as fungi

and viruses.47 A strong argument may be made, however, that this
limited construction frustrates the drafters' intentions. 48 There is

little doubt that this particular prohibition applies to all bacteriological agents that are lethal or severely injurious. From a contractual perspective, however, a stricter interpretation, consonant

with the literal meaning of "bacteriological," is perhaps more
42. See supra text accompanying note 30.
43. Id.
44. Most of the debate centers on whether agents that are not lethal or seriously injurious are included in the Protocol's prohibition. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 89-91. Baxter and Buergenthal conclude that the scope of the Protocol's prohibition extends to "all
chemical agents having a direct toxic effect on man

....

"

Baxter & Bu-

ergenthal, supra note 36, at 866.
45. Protocol, supra note 27, at 575.
46.

THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 76-77.

47. Indeed, one authority limits the definition of bacteriological warfare to
"the use of bacteria" and broadly defines biological warfare to include "the use
of bacteria, other micro-organisms, higher forms of life, such as insects and other
pests, and the toxic products of these." Neinast, supra note 20, at 1 n.1.
48. "If biological agents as presently delineated which infect with disease signify more than the then known bacterial agents, they should also be considered
within the prohibition." THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 77. Baxter and
Buergenthal assert that the comprehensiveness of this specific prohibition is
borne out by the interpretation given it by General Assembly Resolution 2603 A
of December 16, 1969, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 12527. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 868. This interpretation of the Protocol prohibits the use of "[a]ny biological agents of warfare-living organisms,
whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them-which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend
for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal, or plant attacked" in international armed conflicts. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at
126. Even this broad, modern interpretation appears to exclude toxins, which
are not living, not "infective," and do not multiply in a host body. See supra
note 6.
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appropriate. 49

Third, the Protocol limits its proscription of CBWs to "use in

war."'5 0 Preparatory measures such as research, development, production, stockpiling, or transfer apparently are permitted. 1
The scope of the "use in war" requirement is less clear.5 2 Although this requirement encompasses the traditional concept of
international war, or war between or among states, 51 there is little
basis for restricting the Protocol's application to formally declared war. Even though the Protocol may not be applicable "of
its own force" to civil wars or other purely domestic disturbances, 55 it is likely that its drafters intended the Protocol to encompass international armed conflicts,5 6 "whether or not formally
' 57
declared or otherwise recognized by one or both parties.
Application of the "use in war" requirement to armed conflicts
having both international and intranational characteristics is
more difficult.5 8 If hostilities in such a conflict escalate to an ex-

tent that a belligerent participant or an international organization
49. But see 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 72, 139. The SIPRI writers find that
the Protocol's prohibition of "biological means of warfare" is comprehensive and
invites no restrictive interpretation. Id. at 139.
50. Protocol, supra note 27, at 575.
51. S. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 127 (1972); F. KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 91-92 (1973); SIPRI, supra note 36, at 28.
52. It is not helpful merely to observe that the Protocol's prohibitions do not
apply "in non-war situations." See S. BAILEY, supra note 51, at 127.
53. See Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 868. "[T]he Protocol in itself is not applicable to armed conflicts not having an international character." 3
SIPRI, supra note 36, at 28.
54. "'War' is obviously referred to in its material sense rather than in its
formal sense as declared war." Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 868.
After reviewing the events that initiated the 20th century's major conflicts, one
authority notes that "declarations of war are practically out of fashion nowadays
...
." F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 10.
55. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 869.
56. Id. The authors note that "it would be patently out of keeping with the
purposes of the Protocol to apply it in 'war' but not in 'international armed
conflict,' as if any such distinction could be made for the purpose of the use of
weapons in combat." Id.
57. Moore, supra note 36, at 470-71.
58. Baxter and Buergenthal refer to this phenomenon as a "'mixed' conflict"
and cite the Vietnam conflict as an example. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note
36, at 869. The SIPRI writers would categorize the Vietnam conflict as one that
is not exclusively "inter-state, but of an international character." 3 SIPRI, supra
note 36, at 29.

400

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 16:387

or tribunal deem it appropriate to apply the general laws of war
or other international agreements regulating the conduct of hostilities, it would be illogical and inconsistent not to apply the Protocol. 59 Similarly, the involvement of another state in a conflict
essentially within one state may lend sufficient "international
character" to invoke the application of international laws of
war.60 The Australian scholar Julius Stone has observed, however,
that to qualify as an international war, hostilities must exist at
least between governments, if not between states. 1 Thus, if one
party is not a government or does not at least possess "some authority which for the purpose of hostilities has the status of a
government, ' 62 the other belligerent participant is free to deal
with the first party at its "discretion.""3 Submitted almost thirty
years ago,64 Professor Stone's assertions, although modern in their
apparent recognition of modern trends in warfare, 5 lack the perspective of more recent authorities.6 Present day writers likely
would consider the Protocol applicable of its own force to armed
conflicts of international character, whether that character results
from the participation of an identifiable insurgent government or
the involvement of outside states.67 It must be remembered, however, that the Protocol's terms expressly bind only those parties
who have ratified it" 8 and that only states can be parties to the
Protocol.6 ' In its contractual sense, the Protocol therefore applies
59. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 869. The authors note that
"[c]onsistency would seem to demand that the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol become operative paripassu with the rest of the international law of war."

Id.
60. See Moore, supra note 36, at 471.
61. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLicT 305 (2d ed. 1959).
62. Id. Stone cites as examples of this status the insurgent government of
Franco in Spain and the Republic of North Korea during the Korean conflict.

Id.
63.
64.
work.
65.
66.

Id.
The same assertions are made in the first edition of Professor Stone's
J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 305 (1954).
See supra note 54.
See, e.g., supra notes 56 & 59.

67. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
68. See supra text accompanying note 30.

69. But see 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 29. Their view is:
This latter problem [that a belligerent participant cannot be a party to the

Protocol if it is not a state] is, however, mostly formal. The obligation of
an insurgent party within a state to observe humanitarian rules accepted
by that state is no more paradoxical than is the obligation of a new state,
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only to interstate armed conflicts.
The Protocol prohibits its parties, including the Soviet Union

and Vietnam, from resorting to first use of lethal or seriously injurious chemical or bacteriological weapons against other parties
to the Protocol in interstate armed conflict. The use of these
weapons
against
resistance
groups
within
Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, and Laos, none of whom are parties to the Protocol,
apparently would not violate the obligations of either Vietnam or
the Soviet Union.70
C.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)7 1 is more pervasive in scope than the Procotol. The Soviet Union, Vietnam,
and Laos are nonreserving parties to the BWC.7 2 Kampuchea
signed the BWC on April 10, 1972,"8 but had not ratified it as late
as 1981. 4 In accordance with article I of the BWC, each signatory
agrees never to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire
or retain:
(1) [m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their

born into a community of states, to observe the customary rules of that
community.
Id. Would it be any more paradoxical for a state in which there is an insurgent
party to observe humanitarian rules accepted by the insurgent party? See also
Moore, supra note 36, at 471-72. Moore observes that a mixed conflict or highly
violent internal conflict triggers the Protocol's application only if parties to the
Protocol are opposing belligerents. Id. at 471.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34. The acceptance of reservations
is not at issue here. That issue would arise if both belligerent participants were
parties and one party's obligation was qualified by a restrictive reservation while
the other party's was not. Because several major nations ratified the Protocol
with similar restrictive reservations, the significance of an acceptance issue in
the instant situation is undermined. See supra note 32. For a discussion of reservation acceptance, see W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 132-33 (3d ed. 1971).
For a discussion of reservation acceptance with regard to the Protocol, see
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 80.
71. See supra note 27.
72. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 265-66. Afghanistan deposited its
ratification on Mar. 26, 1975. ACDA, supra note 36, at 128. Laos deposited its
ratification on Mar. 20, 1973. Id. at 129. The Soviet Union did so on Mar. 26,
1975. Id. at 130. Vietnam acceded on June 20, 1980. Telephone interview with
employee of the Treaty Office of the Department of State (Mar. 19, 1982).
73. ACDA, supra note 36, at 129.
74. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 266.
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origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes;
(2) [w]eapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use
5
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
The remaining articles of the BWC provide guidelines for reaching the objective of article I.
Article II of the BWC requires each party to destroy or divert
to peaceful use within nine months after the Convention becomes
effective all material prohibited in article I that the state possesses or has within its jurisdiction or control. 6 Article III precludes parties from transferring prohibited materials and forbids
a state party to assist, encourage, or induce "any State, group of
States, or international organizations" in manufacturing or acquiring any of the prohibited materials.7 7 Article IV imposes an
affirmative obligation upon each party to ban within its own territory, or in territories under its control or jurisdiction, those activities proscribed in article 1.78 Pursuant to article VI, a signatory to
the BWC may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the
United Nations if that signatory finds that "any other State Party
is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of
the Convention.17 9 This article also requires each party "to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council
may initiate. . . on the basis of the complaint.
... 10
Article VII demands that each party provide support or assistance to any signatory requesting aid, if the United Nations Security Council decides that a violation of the convention has endangered the requesting party.8 1 Article VIH precludes an
interpretation of the BWC's provisions as a limit or restriction on
the obligation of any signatory that is also a party to the Geneva
Protocol.8 2 Article IX requires each party to continue negotiations
for a ban on chemical weapons.8 3 Article X permits exchange of
equipment and information for peaceful purposes, including sci75. BWC, supra note 28, art. I, at 587.
76. Id. art. II.
77. Id. art. III.

78. Id. art. IV, at 588.
79. Id. art. VI(1).
80. Id. art. VI(2).

81. Id. art. VII, at 589.
82. Id. art. VIII.

83. Id. art. IX.
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entific development and prevention of disease.8 Finally, article
XIII makes the BWC "of limited duration"8 and allows a state
party to withdraw from the convention with three months advance notice to the Security Council if the party decides that "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." s6
The articles of the BWC, together with its assertive preambulary language, 7 absolutely prohibit the use and possession of biological and toxin weapons.88 This prohibition eliminates the interpretational problem arising from the "use in war" requirement of
the Geneva Protocol. 9 Thus, the BWC's force and application do
not depend upon technical distinctions among different types of
armed conflicts, nor do they depend upon technical or scientific
distinctions among different types of agents and weapons. All
"microbial or other biological agents" 90 are proscribed, thereby
avoiding the problem of interpreting the "bacteriological warfare"
language in the Protocol. 1 Also, the complete ban on "microbial
or other biological" weapons and the specific ban on toxin weapons,9 2 precludes the interpretational problems arising from the
Protocol's prohibition against "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other
' '9 3
gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices.
84. Id. art. X, at 590.
85. Id. art. XIII(l), at 591.
86. Id. art. XIII(2).
87. The preamble evidences that the drafters viewed the BWC as a step toward the disarmament of "all types of weapons of mass destruction," particularly chemical weapons. Id. at 585. In the preamble, the parties reaffirmed adherence to the Protocol's principles and objectives and called upon all other
nations to adhere. Id. They also recognized the urgent need to eliminate chemical and biological weapons. Id. Finally, the preamble expresses the parties' determination "to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins being used as weapons." Id. at 586.
88. The SIPRI writers observe that "prohibitions of possession, even though
they.., have as their primary object and purpose the prevention or limitation
of use," do not belong to the law of war. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 14-15.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
90. A microbe is defined as "[a] very minute organism; a microorganism; a
germ;-popularly applied to bacteria, esp. to the pathogenic forms." WxsTms
NEw INTERNATioNAL DiTIoNAY 1552 (2d ed. 1954). Thus "microbial" agents is
likely synonymous with bacteriological agents.
91.

See supra notes 47-49 and text accompanying notes 45-49.

92. See supra note 20.
93. Protocol, supra note 27, at 575; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
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The BWC, despite its admirable goals, has one fatal flaw-a
complete failure to provide for compliance verification or outside
supervision. 4 The BWC does include a procedure for filing a
complaint with the Security CounciP 5 and obliges parties to lend
support or assistance to a Security Council investigation," but
these measures do not meet the objective of rigid control required
in the Preamble. The inclusion of an "escape clause" also undermines the force of the BWC. Article XIII(2) permits a state which
decides its "supreme interests" are jeopardized by "extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of the Convention," to withdraw after giving three months prior notice to the other parties
and the Security Council.97 One authority has commented that
this "escape" mechanism indicates that the BWC is not an "explicit recognition of the absolutely unlawful character of the use
of biological weapons.""8 Although this provision does invite subjective determinations by the governments of individual states, it
is not unique to the BWC99 and may represent merely a recognition of each state's "inherent right" to defend itself.
The parties to the Convention have failed to follow carefully
the provisions of the BWC. In its use of deadly toxins in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is violating articles I,II,and IV of the
BWC. Furthermore, by supplying and assisting the armed forces
of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam in their use of toxin weapons
against resistance groups, the Soviet Union also violated article
III of the BWC. Vietnam transgressed articles I, II, III, and IV of
the BWC by employing toxin weapons against resistance groups
94. See BWC, supra note 28, arts. I-XV, at 587-92.
95. Id. art. VI(1), at 588. Kalshoven comments that this mechanism is "not

an entirely satisfactory solution of the problem of supervision, but at least something." F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 93.
96. BWC, supra note 28, art. VI(2), at 588.
97. Id. art. XIII(2), at 591. The withdrawing state must supply the Security

Council with a statement of the extraordinary events forming the necessity to
withdraw. Id. There is, however, no measure provided in the event the Security

Council deems this statement to be false, erroneous, or an insufficient reason for
withdrawal. See id.

98. 3 SIPRA, supra note 36, at 149.
99. The Partial Test Ban Treaty contains a similarly worded escape clause.

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 1316-17, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,

480 U.N.T.S. 43, 51-53. See also Jenks, Liability for UltrahazardousActivities
in InternationalLaw, [1966] 1 AcADAME DE
COuRs [RECEUIL DES COURS] 99, 144 (1966).
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in Kampuchea and Laos, and by assisting the governments in
those countries to employ toxin weapons. Laos disobeyed articles

I, II, and IV by using toxins against the Hmong in its own
territory.

Kampuchea has signed but not ratified or acceded to the
BWC. 10 0 Nevertheless, there is limited authority that, as a signatory, Kampuchea may not engage in acts contrary to the objectives and purposes of the BWC. 0 1 It is doubtful, however, that
Kampuchea has any legal obligation under the BWC.
D.

Summary

The 1925 Geneva Protocol retains some force as a legal restraint on the use of CBWs. Because of specific contractual terms

and reservations in the Protocol, limiting the obligations of the
Soviet Union and Vietnam, the use of CBWs in Asia has not vio-

lated the prohibitions of the Protocol. The Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Laos all have violated the more comprehensive 1972
BWC, however, by their possession and use of toxin weapons in
Asia.

100. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
101. Kampuchea is also a signatory but not a ratifier of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in L.
HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 264-86 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
BASIC DOCUMENTS]. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting acceptance or approval until it shall have made its intention
clear not to become a party to the treaty ....
Id. at 269. Kampuchea signed the Vienna Convention on May 23, 1969, but has
yet to ratify. Telephone interview with an employee of the Treaty Office of the
State Department (Mar. 19, 1982). If Kampuchea were a fully ratified and obligated party to the Vienna Convention, then the issue would be whether
Kampuchea has made clear its intention not to become a party to the BWC.
Because Kampuchea is not a fully obligated party to the Vienna Convention, its
obligation as a signatory to the BWC is uncertain. Some authority exists to indicate that a state which has signed a treaty requiring ratification has placed some
limitation on its freedom of action. This limitation remains, however, only until
the treaty enters into force. See A. McNAUI, THE LAW OF TREATIES 199 & n.4
(1961). The BWC entered into force for the United States on March 26, 1975.
TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 214.
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

The General Law of War
Several fundamental principles 0 2 in the law of war001 are germane to an examination of the legality of CBWs. These principles
include military necessity, humanity, chivalry,1 04 reprisal, and
self-defense. The first three principles prohibit almost all use of
102. "Principles provide the common denominator for a number of related
rules." G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (5th ed.
1967).
103. Some authorities treat these principles in their discussion of "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" according to article 38(1)(c) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See, e.g., Kelly, Gas Warfare
in InternationalLaw, 9 MIL. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1960); Neinast, supra note 20, at
36; N. SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-64 (1959). These
general principles are a supplementary source, in the event custom and convention provide inadequate assistance in the resolution of a dispute. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952).
One distinguished authority states that the general principles referred to in
article 38(1)(c) "hardly come into the picture" in the area of the law of war. G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 102, at 200. Professor Schwarzenberger submits:
"They [laws and customs of war] are the common denominator of roughly parallel municipal articles of war and rglements, which the leading military nations
had enacted as standards of conduct for their own guidance and largely copied
from one another." Id.
This view is supported by the weight of authority, which has tended to treat
general principles of the law of war not as correlations or analogies to widely
recognized national or municipal law concepts but as basic time-honored customary principles or general rules. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521-22 (1961); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
226-27 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952); see M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
LAND WARFARE 313-16 (1959); F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 27-29; R. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 47-50 (1957); Mallison, The Laws
of War and the Judicial Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in General
and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 312-14 (1967); O'Brien, Biological/Chemical Warfare and the InternationalLaw of War, 51 GEo. L.J. 1, 37-43
(1962). These principles or general rules are said to serve both as a basis for the
development of specific rules and as "a guide for determining the legal status of
weapons and methods of war where no more specific rule is applicable." R.
TUCKER, supra, at 47.
In reliance upon the foregoing authority, the discussion on general international law with regard to CBWs does not include, as per article 38(1)(c) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, an examination of "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." See supra.
104. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 313-16; M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELiciANO, supra note 103, at 521-22; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 226-27; R.
TUCKER, supra note 103, at 46.
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CBWs, and the latter two principles permit their use only in extreme circumstances.

1. Military Necessity and Humanity
A belligerent party participating in an armed conflict strives
primarily to attain submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of life, time, and resources.'015 The principles of
humanity and military necessity both forbid the unnecessary infliction of suffering or destruction.0 6 The principle of military necessity permits a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of
regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, necessary to achieve that objective.10 7 Conversely, the principle of
humanity forbids the use of force in degree or kind which is not
necessary to achieve the objective of armed conflict. 08 The princi-

ple of humanity, therefore, is arguably a proscriptive version of
the military necessity principle rather than a separate and competing interest. 0 9 For this reason, the following discussion focuses
only upon military necessity."10

The military necessity of a particular weapon can be analyzed
properly only in relation to its intended use as a means of achiev-

ing a particular military objective." The necessity first hinges
upon the legitimacy of the military objective; 1 2 this determination is problematic because it is subject to both political and mili-

tary interpretation.'" Second, the military necessity is contingent
105. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 313-14; R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at
364.
106. R. TucKER, supra note 103, at 46.

107. See M.

GREENSPAN,

supra note 103, at 313-14.

M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 315; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103,
R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 46, 364.
O'Brien, supra note 103, at 41. Tucker observes that both principles
unnecessary human suffering and physical destruction; thus military ne"implies" humanity-these are "two aspects of the same principle." R.
TUCKER, supra note 103, at 48 n.8. But cf. Mallison, supra note 103, at 314 ("It
is essential to apply each principle in the light of the other if the common interests of states are to be honored.").
110. See generally O'Brien, The Meaning of 'MilitaryNecessity' in International Law, 1 INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITY 109 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
O'Brien-1].
111. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 195.
112. O'Brien, Legitimate MilitaryNecessity in Nuclear War, in 2 INSTITUTE
OF WORLD POLITY 35, 49 (1960) [hereinafter cited as O'Brien-2].
113. Id.; M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELIcmNo, supra note 103, at 525. "It is not
108.
at 227;
109.
oppose
cessity
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upon the avoidability of the suffering and destruction that a particular weapon inflicts. The demarcation between necessary and
unnecessary suffering, however, is vague and subjective. 1 4
The doctrine of proportionality-the core concept of military
necessity-alleviates these uncertainties to some extent.1"5 This
doctrine provides that the use of a weapon is legal if there is no
significant "disparity between the ensuing destruction of values
and the military advantage gained. 1 16 There must be proportionality "between military ends and military means."117 It is a test of
reasonbleness, requiring evaluation of all the facts, including a
comparison of a particular weapon with alternative weapons,118 in
the context of that particular weapon's use.
Today, the primary focus of the proportionality analysis of
weapons is controllability-the capacity to limit the effects of a
weapon to a certain number or category of people.119 An unconeasy to see how military objectives could be evaluated as legitimate or nonlegitimate save in terms of their relation to some broader political purpose postulated
as legitimate."). Id. at 526.
114. Baxter, The Role of Law in Modern War, 47 PROc. AM. Soc'¥ INT'L L.
90, 91 (1953); Brungs, supra note 20, at 59-60.
115. See O'Brien, supra note 103, at 41.
116. Mallison, supra note 103, at 322-23.
117. O'Brien-2, supra note 112, at 54. McDougal and Feliciano make a more
comprehensive statement of proportionality, which they term "the fundamental
policy of minimum unnecessary destruction":
[W]here the suffering or deprivation of values incidental to the use of a
particular weapon is not excessively disproportionate to the military advantage accruing to the belligerent user, the violence and the weapon by
which it is effected may be regarded as permissible. All war instruments
are "cruel" and "inhuman" in the sense that they cause destruction and
human suffering. It is not, however, the simple fact of destruction, nor
even the amount thereof, that is relevant in the appraisal of such instruments; it is rather the needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the gross imbalance between the military result and the incidental injury that is commonly regarded as decisive of illegitimacy.
M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 615-16. A disproportionate use
of a weapon occurs when one side drops a delayed action bomb, but the bomb
does not explode until after the war is concluded. Mallison, supra note 103, at
323.
118. See O'Brien, supra note 103, at 41-42; O'Brien-2, supra note 112, at 55.
The proportionality analysis necessarily shifts the focus of the issue away from
illegality per se to illegality in a concrete situation. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 20, at 208. Indeed, one authority characterizes proportionality as "a limitation on the use of authorized weapons." Neinast, supra note 20, at 36.
119. This is even more important considering the demise of the distinction
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trollable CBW which causes serious harm indiscriminately on a
vast scale would qualify as inherently disproportionate because it
could not "achieve military objectives without disproportionate
ancillary destruction."' 120 Yet the authorities agree that because
CBWs vary in harmfulness and controllability, a blanket ban on
CBWs based upon proportionality is untenable.121
Given the large-scale military objectives of a major armed conflict, proportionality allows for considerable ancillary suffering
and destruction in the use of a particular weapon. 122 That level of

suffering and destruction, however, may be disproportionate in a
limited war,12 in which both technical and tactical controllability
between combatants and noncombatants. The immunity of noncombatants was
considered a fundamental rule of the law of war. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
103, at 524. Modern technology, particularly in aerial and submarine warfare,
and modern modes of armed conflict, particularly total war and guerrilla warfare, have reduced its viability. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 39-40. Some authorities indicate that this distinction still has force. See, e.g., F. KALSHOVEN, supra
note 51, at 28. Professors McDougal and Feliciano observe that the conditions or
premises upon which this rule is based, namely the limitations of military technology and the lack of civilian participation in the "belligerent effort," are no
longer necessarily extant. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELcIANO, supra note 103, at 58081. These modern developments narrow the rule to a prohibition against attacks
directed primarily at civilians who are completely unconnected with military operations, productions, or communications. See O'Brien, supra note 103, at 40,
42; see also Nurick, The DistinctionBetween Combatant and Noncombatant in
the Law of War, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1945).
120. Mallison, supranote 103, at 342. A virulent epidemic biological agent is
an example of this type of CBW. Id. at 324.
121. See, e.g., id. at 322-28, 342-44; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra
note 103, at 632-40. O'Brien makes the following observation with regard to nuclear weapons, which also could apply to CBWs:
[T]here can be no valid blanket, a priori, acceptance or condemnation of
nuclear weapons. While it is clear that the larger nuclear devices are not,
as some claimed in 1945, "just another weapon," the development of such
a variety of bombs-large and small, "clean" and "dirty," and of such a
spectrum of uses for them, precludes a generic, universal condemnation of
nuclear weapons as inherently disproportionate and beyond the limits of
legitimate military necessity.
O'Brien-2, supra note 112, at 76.
122. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 209. A virtually uncontrollable
and indiscriminate weapon can cause disproportionate suffering even in a total
war context. Mallison, supra note 103, at 342. Professor O'Brien argues that
even with an indiscriminate weapon all the considerations in its use must be
evaluated to determine proportionality. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 42.
123. Mallison, supra note 103, at 342. A relatively early definition of limited
war is that
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is critical. 12 4 Thus, "if biological or chemical weapons are to be
used lawfully in limited war they must be weapons of very limited
destructive power which are employed under the most rigid technological and tactical controls," 125 and which result in no disproportionate suffering or destruction in relation to the military ob-

126
jective for which they are used.

Arguably, CBWs have been employed against resistance
fighters in Asia with sufficient controllability to avoid disproportionate ancillary suffering. 12 7 Although classifiable as biological
agents, the mycotoxins used are neither contagious nor epidemicinducing.1 28 Thus, the degree of controllability required in limited
conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos may
be satisfied. The consideration which renders disproportionate
the use of lethal or seriously injurious agents in Asia, however, is
the existence of alternative conventional weapons.12 ' The superior
military capabilities of the Soviet Union's forces enable them to
achieve their limited military objective-the suppression of insurgency-by more conventional means. In light of this obvious military advantage, the Soviet motivation for employing CBWs in
Asia is unclear.

in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated
in a negotiated settlement. Generally speaking, a limited war actively involves only two (or very few) major belligerents in the fighting. The battle
is confined to a local geographical area and directed against selected
targets-primarily those of direct military importance.
R. OSGOOD, LIMrrED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY, at 1-2 (1957),
quoted in Mallison, supra note 103, at 340-41.
124. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 209; Mallison, supra note 103,

at 342.
125. Mallison, supra note 103, at 343.
126. Thus CBWs are analyzed according to military necessity in a manner no
different from other more conventional weapons. See O'Brien, supra note 103, at

43.
127. The number of deaths documented by the State Department-a minimum of approximately 10,000 over a period of approximately six
years-suggests that there has been little large scale indiscriminate use of the
weapons. See Tennessean (Nashville), Mar. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
128. See supra note 20.
129. See supra text accompanying note 118.
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2.

Chivalry

The principle of chivalry recognizes the need for fairness, forbearance, and mutual respect between belligerent opponents, 13 0
and forbids the use of treacherous or dishonorable methods of

conducting hostilities. 13 1 This principle emerged in the context of
knightly combat during the Middle Ages, 32 but its viability in the
age of modern warfare, when combatants and noncombatants are
killed in great numbers from considerable distances, is insignificant or nonexistent. 33 Because the principle connotes forbear-

ance, however, it still may have vitality in the context of a limited
armed conflict, in which at least one party refrains from bringing

its full military might to bear.' 3 This argument, however, ignores
the reality that modern military technology has depersonalized

the conduct of hostilities.'3 5 Today even a limited armed conflict
entails the use of methods which kill or injure many at a distance."3 " It is therefore unlikely that chivalry can be cited as the

basis of legal restraint in the use of CBWs.
3.

Reprisal

The right of reprisal is a means by which the laws of war may
be enforced. 137 This right permits otherwise unlawful acts by one

belligerent in response to violations of the laws of war by an op130. 2 M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 316; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
103, at 227; J. STONE, supra note 61, at 337.
131. R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 46.
132. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 227.
133. See J. STONE, supra note 61, at 337; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO,
supra note 103, at 522. Professor Mallison dismisses this principle as "a relic of
medieval times." Mallison, supra note 103, at 312.
Arguably, odorless and colorless CBWs are weapons whose use is treacherous.
See R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 52 n.15. The element of surprise, however,
has always been a legitimate military tactic or strategy. Brungs, supra note 20,
at 59 (noting that accepted weapons such as land mines and booby traps also
give no warning). Thus, "treachery" connotes a breach of faith or confidence
rather than an act of clandestine nature, id., such as feigning surrender to flush
the enemy and then killing him. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 39.
134. See supra note 123.
135. See supra text accompanying note 133.
136. Professor Stone notes that the devices and methods used even in handto-hand combat, such as bayonets, are meant for quick death and not for sportsmanlike dueling. J. STONE, supra note 61, at 338.
137. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 407; J. STONE, supra note 61, at 353;
R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 151.
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posing belligerent.13 ' The purpose of reprisal is to warn the enemy that the aggrieved state will neither tolerate these violations
nor be put at a disadvantage because of them. 139 Theoretically,
the objective is not to get revenge but to enforce the laws of
war. 140 Accordingly, acts of reprisal are taken as a last resort after
other efforts seeking compliance have failed. Reprisal actions
must cease when the enemy's illegal acts cease.14 1 Although the
reprisal need not be identical to the provoking act, it "must not
be excessive nor exceed the degree of violation committed by the
'142
enemy.
The proportionality requirement is of considerable importance
in the doctrine of reprisal, but there are two areas of difficulty in
applying proportionality to reprisal situations. First, there is confusion about whether the reprisal must be proportionate to the
provoking act or whether it must be proportionate in light of the
end sought-for example, the cessation of illegal acts by the enemy. 43 Traditionally, the basis of proportionality in reprisal was
the former, but the practicality of the latter basis has gained
favor.1 44 This latter basis, however, would seem to authorize a degree of force greater than that of the provoking act.1 45 Second,
reprisal need not be in kind,1 4 and consequently it is difficult to
assess the proportionality of two different types of violence.1 47 Reprisal therefore remains susceptible to abuse and conceivably can
14 8
lead to escalation of hostilities.

138. R. TUcKER, supra note 103, at 151.
139. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 408.
140. Id.
141. R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 151.
142. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 412. The classic examination of the
requirements for legal reprisal is in the Naulilla Incident Arbitrationr 8 Trib.
Arb. Mixtes 409 (1928), reprinted in W. BISHOP, supra note 70, at 903-04.
143. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 682-83; R. TucKER, supra note 103, at 153 n.9; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 45-46.
144. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 682.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALrrY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 41 (1958).
148. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 112; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO,
supra note 103, at 681; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 47. Professor O'Brien observed in 1962 that abuse of the right of reprisal was the chief problem facing
the law of chemical and biological warfare, but that it "remains the only really
effective sanction for the law of war in a world which does not accept a binding
universal norm in international law." O'Brien, supra note 103, at 49.
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A discussion of weapons which can be employed in reprisal
should not address so-called "legal" weapons because any act of
reprisal is by its nature unlawful. If CBWs are legal per se, 1then
49 If
their inclusion in a discussion of reprisal is inappropriate.
CBWs are illegal per se or mala in se, then their use, even in
reprisal, is forbidden. 150 The thesis of this Note asserts that the
legal status of CBWs falls between these two extremes. Thus, the
use of certain CBWs in reprisal may be legal in certain
circumstances.
Using a CBW in response to an opposing belligerent's illegal
first use, is a reprisal in kind, 15 ' and may be legal if the act of
reprisal is reasonably proportionate. 52 The legality of using a
CBW in reprisal not in kind is more uncertain. If proportionality
is determined according to the violence of the provoking act, use
of a lethal or seriously injurious CBW might be legal in response
to some heinous act of provocation. If proportionality is determined considering only what is needed to stop the illegal act (this
would imply that an act of greater force than the original illegal
act might be authorized), use of a lethal or seriously injurious
CBW still may be legal if it is reasonably proportionate.'5 3 The
act of reprisal, however, must not be one of "violence so gross as
to have no reasonable relation to the postulated deterrent effect,"
for then it could be "characterized, not as a legitimate reprisal,
54
but as a new and independent unlawful act.'"
The present vitality of the reprisal doctrine's justification of
force is uncertain. Twentieth century attempts to establish "an
international juridical order,"' 55 as witnessed in the creation of
the League of Nations and the United Nations, have brought with
them significant limitations on the permissible extent to which a
party can resort to unilateral force."5 The tendency, however, for

149. See
150.

THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 218-19.
See O'Brien, supra note 103, at 47.

151. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 344.
152. Professor Mallison would require that the retaliatory use be directed

and controlled and not involve militarily meaningless mass destruction. Mallison, supra note 103, at 328.
153. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 221.
154.

M.

McDOUGAL &

F. FELCANO, supra note 103, at 682.

155. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 43 n.121.
156. Id. Member states of the United Nations must "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3. They
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states subscribing to the international juridical order to deviate
from its constraints is sufficient reason for ascribing some present
recognition to the principle of reprisal. 15 7 Nevertheless, the right
of reprisal is no justification for the present use of CBWs in Asia.
The target insurgent groups have not used CBWs against the Soviets, Vietnamese, or Laotians. Moreover, if any of the insurgent
groups have committed a violation of international law so heinous
and barbaric as to warrant the use of lethal and seriously injurious CBWs in reprisal, the United Nations should be so apprised.
4. Self-Defense
The right of self-defense permits "a political entity, usually a
state, to take all measures necessary for its protection when its
vital interests are endangered by an aggressive, illegal act of another state. The act of aggression gives the injured party the right
to take all counter-measures." 1 Implicit in the concept of legitimate self-defense are the requirements of necessity and proportionality.159 The necessity may result from an actual act of aggression or from an imminent threat thereof. 60
must also "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. .

. ."

Id.

art. 2, para. 4; see also J. STONE, supra note 61, at 286-87 ("[U]nder the Charter,
it is only in the milder cases of international controversy, and only by the milder
forms of coercion, applied consistently with paragraph 3 of article 2 in such a
way as not to endanger peace and security, that a Member State is now entitled
to resort to forcible or coercive procedures.").
157. "In the context of continuing hostilities, and until a comprehensive,
centralized, and effective sanctions process is achieved in the world arena, belligerents have to police one another and enforce the laws of war against each
other." M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 681-82.
158. O'Brien-1, supra note 110, at 112.
159. See l.BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
261-62 (1963); M. McDouAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 217-18.
The classic formulation of the requirements of legitimate self-defense is set
out in the Caroline incident of 1837 by then Secretary of State Daniel Webster.
He stated that there first must be "a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no movement for deliberation," the
response to which must be "nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept
clearly within it," quoted in J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 406.
160. This latter is the concept of anticipatory self-defense, which characterized the fact situation of the Caroline incident. It is customarily permitted if
"the expected attack exhibit[s] so high a degree of imminence as to preclude
effective resort by the intended victim to nonviolent modalities of response." M.
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'
which purports to reThe "international juridical order,"161
placed limitations
have
may
force,
to
resort
strict the unilateral
16 2
The United Nations Charter
upon the right of self-defense.
preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.' 63 This provision,
with its apparent requirement that the initial illegal action be an
armed attack, has been the source of much debate regarding
whether the provision restricts the customary right of self-defense
by establishing a tougher standard of necessity. 16 4 Commentators
have recognized that, given the presence of modern technological
weapons and the increasing number of threats taking the form of
nonmilitary coercion, a restrictive view of "the inherent right of
self-defense" might permit responsive force only after it is too
16 5

late.

The degree of proportionality required in self-defense depends
upon whether the objective of self-defense is to repel or to remove
the danger.16 6 Presumably, if removal is a legitimate objective,
greater force is legally permissible than if repulsion is the only
objective. It is thus difficult to place a meaningful limit upon the
use of force in self-defense. "67 Professors McDougal and Feliciano
offer the most practical approach. Their analysis identifies the
objective of self-defense as the termination of "the condition
McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 231.
161. See supra text accompanying note 155.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
163. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 1.

164. For treatment of the view that article 51 has altered the customary
right, see J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 503-04 (7th ed.
1972); J. STONE, supra note 61, at 244-47; Kunz, Individual and Collective SelfDefense in Article 51 of the Charterof the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
872, 877-79 (1947); J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 420-21; I. BROWNLE,supra note
164, at 270-80; M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 138-41; R.
OSGOOD & R. TUCKER, FORCE, ORDER, AND JUSTICE 296-97 (1967).
165. See M. McDouGAL & F. FELicINo, supranote 103, at 238; R. OSGOOD &
R. TUCKER, supra note 164, at 296; see also THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20,
at 225 ("Presumably the purpose of the Charter's article was to enable nations
to protect their essential rights when gravely threatened and not to insure that

their epitaph would be able to testify to their lawful behavior.").
166. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (R. Tucker rev.
2d ed. 1966); R. OsGooD & R. TucKER, supra note 164, at 300.
167. H. KELSEN, supra note 166, at 83.
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which necessitates responsive coercion." 16 8 According to this approach, proportionality requires an analysis of the entire factual
context comprising both the elements relating to the initial aggression or threat and those relating to the responsive force. 169
17 0
The debate continues however.

The issue concerning the type of force which may be used in
self-defense has arisen in the nuclear arms context. If the objective of self-defense is repulsion, then the use of a nuclear weapon
might not be a proportionate response to a more conventional
threat or attack.1 7 If the objective is removal, however, proportionality might permit a greater degree of force.' 7 2 This analysis
may apply to the use of a CBW in self-defense unless all use of
the CBW in question was banned by convention or custom. 7 3 Finally, some scholars argue that when one state threatens world
domination or the extermination of another state, these threats
are so grave that the use of any necessary means, including prohibited weapons of mass destruction, is permitted in defense. 1 4

168.

M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 242.

169. Id. at 243. Indeed, in instances in which sovereign integrity and national
well-being are allegedly at stake, a "reasonableness" standard such as that submitted by Professors McDougal and Feliciano makes more sense than a doctrinal limitation upon the right of a state to neutralize a threat either actual or
urgently imminent.
170. Kelsen cites three modern examples of the use of force in self-defense:
The Israeli attack upon Egypt in 1956; the United States "quarantine" of Cuba
in 1962; and the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964. In all three instances, the force
exerted in self-defense was designed to effect the removal of alleged danger. See
H. KELSEN, supra note 166, at 82 n.74.
171. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 159, at 262-63. N. SINGH, supra note 108, at
133. Professor Singh concludes that the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense is
proportionate only to repel an initial nuclear attack. Id. at 136.
172. But see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 147, at 40 ("[Tlo permit the
use of prohibited weapons to a victim of aggression would serve merely to encourage their use by all.").
173. Use of a biological agent that took time to infect, spread, and disable
might undermine the necessity requirement of self-defense. This would show
that the threat was not so immediate or urgent that noncoercive measures could
not have been resorted to first. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 224.
174. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 351 n.2; O'Brien-1, supra note
110, at 170. But see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 147, at 42 ("As, in a divided world, each side is bound to accuse the other of this ultimate design
[world domination], the function of this asserted right or duty ... is to provide
in advance, and indiscriminately, both sides with semi-legal justifications for the
use of the 'ultimate deterrent.' ").
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The use of lethal or seriously injurious CBWs may be legally
justifiable in the following limited instances of self-defense: (1) If
repulsion is the object of self-defense, CBW use may be proportionate in the event of threat or attack by nuclear weapon or
CBW; (2) if removal is the object, CBW use may be proportionate
in the event of threat or attack by conventional or nuclear
weapon or CBW; and (3) if extermination or world domination is
threatened, the gravity of the threat may justify use of CBWs.
The instant hypothetical does not present a case of self-defense. Superior forces are seeking to neutralize or exterminate resistance groups. Even if the resistance groups could be characterized as "aggressors," the use of lethal and seriously injurious
agents against these outnumbered and relatively ill-equipped
groups substantially exceeds the proportionality requirement of
self-defense.
5. Summary
The principle of military necessity and its doctrine of proportionality continue as vital elements of the law of war. Although
these principles may not make the use of CBWs a priori unlawful, they do operate to render the use of CBWs in Asia unlawful.
The principles of reprisal and self-defense may permit the use of
CBWs within very limited circumstances, but these circumstances
are not present in the instant case.
B. Treaties
1. Introduction
International agreements on CBWs have contributed to public
international law as "law-making" treaties. Because a significant
number of states are signatories, these treaties express a general
understanding of the status of CBWs in existing international law
or, at the least, represent attempts to establish "a new general
international rule for future conduct." 17 5 Although these "lawmaking treaties" immediately create law for their signatories, 176
nontreaty states may bind themselves to the stated international
legal rules by express or tacit acceptance and conformance.1 77 Ar175. J. BRIERLY, supra note 20, at 58; see also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
103, at 26-27.
176. J. BRERLY, supra note 164, at 58.

177.

G.

HACKWORTH,

supra note 24, at 17; 1 L.

OPPENHEIM,

supra note 103,
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guably, these treaties have created both a general international
legal restraint prohibiting the first use of lethal or seriously injurious chemical weapons and a moral restraint prohibiting the use
of biological weaponry, even though the treaties may no longer
have the force of binding international law.
2.

The St. PetersburgDeclarationof 1868

Recent efforts to impose legal restraint upon the means and
methods of warfare usually are traced to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.15 The Declaration specifically banned explosive
and inflammable bullets finding:
That the only legitimate objective.., to accomplish during war is
to weaken the military forces of the enemy;...
That this objective would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render
their death inevitable;
such arms would, therefore, be contrary to
That the employment of
1
the laws of humanity.

7

The present force and significance of the Declaration are
grounded upon its preambulary enunciation of the principle of
military necessity. Also included is a reaffirmation of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants 80 in war, 8" and,
more importantly, a recognition of the doctrine of proportionality
concerning the use of weapons and wartime objectives. 8 " It generat 27.
178. Declaration Renouncing Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Parry's T.S. 297 (French text) (official source unavailable), reprinted in SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 27, at 95-97. The Declaration was the product of an international military commission convened to
address problems presented by the invention of an exploding bullet. THOMAS &
THOMAS, supra note 20, at 45.
179. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, reprintedat 96. The nineteen contracting or acceding parties to the convention agreed to be bound only as between themselves in case of war. Id. The obligatory effect was to cease if a nonparty joined a belligerent participant in a war between the parties. Id. Most of
the states are still considered bound because effectiveness of the Declaration is
not dependent upon ratification. See O'BRIEN, supra note 103, at 17, 18 & n.43.
180. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
181. See S. BAILEY, supra note 51, at 125.
182. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, reprinted at 96. It was deemed
that small explosive projectiles caused suffering disproportionate to the military
advantage gained by using them, whereas larger explosive projectiles caused pro-
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ally is agreed that the prohibition in the Declaration forbidding
the use of exploding or inflammable bullets no longer has force,
but its premable presently binds all states to the extent
that it is
83
declaratory of military necessity and proportionality.
Some authorities have discussed the possible derivation of a
rule that would apply to CBWs and prohibit the use of weapons
exceeding the limits of military necessity and proportionality.
Some analysts believe that this exercise in application has not
been successful. Professor O'Brien. observes that because there
are different types of chemical and biological weapons, not all
CBWs unnecessarily aggravate suffering or render death inevitable."" Consequently, the language of the Declaration has no more
relevance to CBWs than to any other kind of weapon. 85 Major
Neinast similarly observes that because biological agents tend to
affect individuals differently, they do not necessarily "render
death inevitable."' 86 Thus the Declaration survives primarily
as a
87
proportionality.
and
necessity
military
of
statement
3.

The Hague Gas Declaration

The First Hague International Peace Conference convened in
1899 and produced the Hague Gas Declaration' s in another atportionate suffering. S. BAILEY, supra note 51, at 124; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 20, at 45.
183. See M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 553-55; SCHINDLER & TOMAN,
supra note 27, at 95; J. STONE, supra note 61, at 552; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 20, at 45; Neinast, supra note 20, at 22-23. See also O'Brien, supra note
103, at 19 (The "status" of the Declaration's preambulary prohibition "as an
independent norm is extremely questionable .
.
184. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 19.
185. Id. at 19-20. Professor O'Brien prefers "a discriminatory application of
the principle of proportionality to different types of [biological/chemical] weapons in the context of their normal or anticipated employment." Id. at 19.
186. Neinast, supra note 20, at 24. Neinast finds the prohibition against
weapons which "uselessly aggravate suffering" too subjective to be useful. Id. at
23. Colonel Brungs also finds that the "render death inevitable" language is not
necessarily applicable to biological agents because practical and medical precautions may neutralize their lethal effects. Brungs, supra note 20, at 57-58.
187. According to the preamble, the accomplishment of the Military Commission was to have fixed, by common agreement, "the technical limits at which
the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity .
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, reprinted at 96.
188. Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Parry's
T.S. 453 (French text) (official source unavailable), reprinted in SCHINDLER &
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tempt to limit arms proliferation. 18 9 Inspired by the Declaration
of St. Petersburg, the parties agreed "to abstain from the use of
projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
or deleterious gases."19 0 Like the St. Petersburg Declaration, this
treaty has an obligatory effect on its signatories provided that
only parties are participants in the conflict.19 '
The present power of the Hague Gas Declaration is questionable. Its proscription of projectiles that exist only to diffuse poisonous gas is too limited in scope to affect significantly the use of
modern CBWs.1 92 Three parties to the convention-France, Germany, and Great Britain- 1 9 3 so completely circumvented this
technical provision during World War I, that Professor O'Brien
concludes that the Hague Gas Declaration "did not survive the
war as an effective conventional restraint on gas." 194
There is authority, however, for the proposition that the Hague
Declaration affirmed the customary rule against the use of poisons in warfare. 9 5 Nevertheless, the weight of authority maintains that the Declaration is too specific in its prohibitory scope
and too contractual in its obligatory effect to have force as a dec-

TOMAN, supra note 27, at 99-101.
189. SCHINDLER & TO MAN, supra note 27, at 49.

190. Id. reprinted at 99. The Declaration was binding only upon parties who
ratified or acceded to it. It would cease to be binding if a nonparty joined a
party in a war. Id. reprinted at 99-100.
191. Twenty-eight states ratified or acceded with 10 years after the Declaration was signed. Id. reprinted at 100-01. The United States did not become a
party, objecting that there was both limited knowledge about the use of gas projectiles and doubt whether gas projectiles would be any less humane than other
weapons. See Bernstein, The Law of Chemical Warfare, 10 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
889, 900-01 (1942); Kelly, supra note 103, at 22-23.
192. Using "a strict interpretation of the declaration it could be argued that
projectiles emitting gases which had other purposes than the diffusion of harmful gases did not come within its scope, nor did gases released into the wind
from containers." M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 355.
193. The Germans used gas-dispensing stationary cylinders and projectiles
not having as their sole function the diffusion of gas, and the French used projectiles containing tear gas which they claimed was not "asphyxiating or deleterious." Bunn, supra note 40, at 376.
194. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 20.
195. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 233, 340, 497; N. SINGH, supra note
103, at 154-55; J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 188 (3d ed. 1947) ("The
prohibition of the use of poison is one of the oldest and most generally admitted
rules of warfare.").
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laration of customary international law.196 The Declaration has a
two-fold significance: (1) it preserves the spirit of the St. Petersburg Declaration in its preamble and (2) it represents the first
international agreement to place any specific limitation on the
1 97
employment of chemical weaponry.
4.

The Hague Regulations

In 1907 at the Second Hague International Peace Conference,
the delegates produced a revised Convention 9" and Regulations 9 9
similar to the agreement20 0 and regulations 20 1 which the delegates
at the 1899 Conference produced. The following discussion focuses on the language of the 1907 Convention and Regulations.
The preamble stated that the objectives of the 1907 Convention
were to revise "the general laws and customs of war" and "to di-

minish the evils of war" in a manner consistent with military requirements. 2 The heart of the Convention is the Regulations.20 3

196. E.g., Fuller, The Application of InternationalLaw to Chemical and Biological Warfare, 10 ORBIS 247, 250 (1966).
197. Id. at 249-50.
198. Final Act of the Second International Peace Conference, Oct. 18, 1907,
205 Parry's T.S. 216 (French text) (official source unavailable) [hereinafter cited
as the 1907 Convention], reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at
63-68. Thirty-two states became parties by ratification or accession with only
four minor reservations. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 90-91. The 1907
Convention superseded the 1899 Convention, see infra note 200, except the 1899
Convention remained in force for states who were parties to the 1899 Convention but not parties to the 1907 Convention. 1907 Convention, supra, art. 4, reprinted at 65-66. Like the St. Petersburg and Hague Gas Declarations, see
supra notes 178, 188, the 1907 Convention is binding only between parties and
only during a war in which all the belligerents are parties. Id. art. 2, reprinted at
65.
199. SCHINDLER & TomAN, supra note 27, reprinted at 69-87 [hereinafter
cited as 1907 Regulations].
200. Convention Respecting Laws and Customs of Land War, July 29, 1899,
187 Parry's T.S. 429 (French text) (official source unavailable) [hereinafter cited
as 1899 Convention], reprinted in SCHINDLER & TomAN, supra note 27, at 63-68.
Forty-six states became parties to this Convention by ratification or accession
with no reservations. SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 27, at 88-89.
201. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, reprinted at 69-87 [hereinafter
cited as 1899 Regulations].
202. 1907 Convention, supra note 198, at 225-26, reprinted at 63-64.
203. See supra note 199. The Convention requires each party to issue instructions to its armed forces in conformity with the Regulations. 1907 Convention, supra note 198, art. 1, reprinted at 65. In addition, a party violating a
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Article 22 establishes the principle of limited belligerency. 20 4 Article 23 specifically forbids a party: "(a) To employ poison or
poisoned weapons; (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army;... (e) To employ arms,
projectiles, 5 or material calculated to cause unnecessary
'20
suffering.
The present force and significance of the 1899 and the 1907
conventions derive primarily from their codification of the principle of military necessity. Both the preamble and article 22 evidence the intent to "diminish the evils of war, as far as military
requirements permit.

' 20

Furthermore, article 23(e) 20 7 corre-

sponds to the prohibition of the St. Petersburg Declaration on the
use of arms which "uselessly aggravate" suffering. 208 The prohibition of treachery in warfare stated in article 23(b) appears only to
enunciate the principle of chivalry, no longer particularly relevant
to current technological methods of warfare. 20 9 Article 23(a),
which prohibits the use of "poison or poisoned weapons," 210 is the
focus of considerable debate. Although it generally is agreed that
this provision codifies international law,2 1 it remains uncertain
Regulation in wartime could incur compensatory liability. Id. art. 3, reprintedat
65.
204. 1907 Regulations, supra note 199, art. 22, reprinted at 76.
205. Id. art. 23, reprinted at 76-77. Articles 22 and 23 of the 1899 Regulations were almost identical. 1899 Regulations, supra note 201, reprinted at 7677.
206. 1907 Convention, supra note 198, at 225-26, reprinted at 63-64.
207. See supra text accompanying note 205.
208. See supra text accompanying note 179; see also M. GREENSPAN, supra
note 103, at 353; Neinast, supra note 20, at 25.
209. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying note 205.
211. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 342; G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 147, at 26-27, 35-36; SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 57;
O'Brien, supra note 103, at 21; N. SINGH, supra note 103, at 155; Fuller, supra
note 196, at 250; Kelly, supra note 103, at 24. Grotius proscribed the use of
poison to kill the enemy, the use of poisoned arrows or projectiles, and the
poisoning of fountains and wells. H. GRoTius, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 327-28
(W. Whewell trans. 1853). He speculated that the rule against the use of poison
derived from nobility or royalty, against whom such a secretive device might be
the only effective weapon. Id. at 327. The use of poisoned weapons, such as arrows or projectiles, although not necessarily secretive were against the Law of
Nations, probably because they "doubl[ed] the means of death." Id. at 328. Dr.
Schwarzenberger notes the two separate aspects of the rule became accepted as
part of the law of war among European states by the beginning of the eighteenth
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whether it applies to modern weaponry such as CBWs. Article
23(a) arguably maintains broad applicability and prohibits modern nonconventional arms such as nuclear weapons and CBWs.21 2
Limited to a strictly literal interpretation, article 23(a) prohibits
certain modern nonconventional arms because they can be defined as poison or as having a poisonous effect.2 1 3 A more persuasive approach, however, seeks to ascertain whether the Hague
drafters also intended to prohibit then unknown means of conducting hostilities. Various writers agree that the Hague drafters
sought to address only those methods of warfare known at the
time, such as the use of poisoned bayonets or swords and the secretive poisoning of food and water supplies.21 4
The inclusion of the principle of military necessity in both of
the Hague conventions and the subsequent adoption of these conventions by a number of states evidences the establishment of a
general international law which continues to serve as a primary

limitation on the conduct of hostilities and which may be presently applicable to the use of CBWs.
5.

World War I Peace Treaties

The Treaty of Versailles 215 concluded the hostilities between
the Allies and Germany following World War I. Article 171 of the

century. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 147, at 30-31. These restraints derived from the principles of chivalry and humanity as applied to the military.
See J. STONE, supra note 61, at 554.
212. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 359 (gas and bacteriological warfare);
G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 147, at 35-36 (nuclear weapons); N. SINGH,
supra note 103, at 157-58 (nuclear weapons); Brungs, supra note 20, at 58-59
(toxins).
213. See, e.g., Brungs, supra note 20, at 58-59 C'[I]t would appear that...
toxins are covered by the above prohibition ... for the reason that toxins, although 'poisons produced by living things,' are nevertheless poisons .... ").
214. Kelly, supra note 103, at 44; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 21-22. Professor O'Brien concludes that article 23(a) probably does not apply to chemical
warfare because the Hague drafters could have addressed it specifically, rather
than leave the treatment of gas to the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration. See supra
note 188. Because the capability of mounting a large scale attack with biological
agents was at that time almost nonexistent, Professor O'Brien also concludes
that biological warfare is not covered. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 22. Because
the regulation was drafted before gas was equated with poison, article 23(a) was
not meant to apply to the use of poisonous gas. Kelly, supra note 103, at 44.
215. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry's T.S. 188 (official source
unavailable).
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Treaty addresses the use of gas in warfare stating that "the use of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices.. .[and] their manufacture and importation
are strictly forbidden in Germany." 216 The treaties between the
Allies and Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary each contain a similar
provision. 2x Although the United States never ratified the Treaty
of Versailles, 218 the prohibitory provision is incorporated by reference in the Treaty of Berlin,219 to which the United States was a
signatory. The passage of article 171 was a reaction to the deployment of lethal gas by both sides during World War J.220 Although
the article fails to expressly prohibit the use of gas in warfare, it
intimates the prior existence of an accepted rule against the use
of gas weaponry. This provision represented the broadest conventional prohibition of chemical weaponry at the time, broader in
scope than the Hague Gas Declaration of 1899.221
Complete disregard of article 171 during World War II seriously undermined its significance. The present viability and force
of these peace treaties result from a continued consensus among
many nations 222 that some limitation on the use of gas in the conduct of hostilities is necessary.
6. The Washington Naval Treaty
Article V of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty22 3 acknowl216. Id. art. 171, at 268.
217. Treaty of St. Germain, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 135, 226 Parry's T.S. 8, 47
(official source unavailable) (Austria); Treaty of Neuilly, Nov. 27, 1919, art. 82,
226 Parry's T.S. 332, 350 (official source unavailable) (Bulgaria); Treaty of Treanon, June 4, 1920, art. 119, 3 Redmond T.S. 3539 (official source unavailable)
(Hungary), quoted in M. GREENSPAN,supra note 103, at 356 n.171.
218. The failure to ratify was largely due to provisions establishing the
League of Nations. See Bunn, supra note 40, at 376.
219. Treaty of Berlin, Aug. 25, 1925, United States-Germany, 42 Stat. 1939,
1943 T.S. No. 658.
220. M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 355; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 2324.
221. Cf. supra text accompanying note 192.
222. Twenty-six of the allied states signed the Paris Peace Treaties. 2 A.V.
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF CHEMIcAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 72 (1968) (prepared
for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) [hereinafter cited as 2
THOMAS & THOMAS].

223. Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 16, 1922, 3 Redmond T.S. 3116 (no official source printed), reprinted
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edges the prohibition and condemnation of the use of gaseous
weapons generally accepted by a majority of civilized nations. It
further declares that "this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience
and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition,
agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all
other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

' 224

Other substantive

provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty deal with naval and
submarine warfare. 22 5 Although nine nations, including the

United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, ratified or
acceded 2 6 to its terms, the Treaty was to take effect only upon
ratification by all parties present at the treaty conference.227 The
agreement never became effective because France objected to the
submarine warfare limitations and refused to ratify the Treaty.228
The significance of the Washington Naval Treaty stems from
its reiteration of the broad prohibitory language in the World
War I peace treaties. Some of the language in article V may be
overstated 229 because it implies that there was no customary international law against gas at the time of its enactment,230 yet
article V does recognize a broad legal constraint on the use of gas
by the major powers.231
7. The Geneva Protocol
The Geneva Protocol (Protocol)232 is the most significant source
of general internationgi law on arms limitation. 23 3 The Protocol
in SCHINDLER & TomAN, supra note 27, at 657-59 [hereinafter cited as Washington Naval Treaty]. The Treaty is the product of the conference on the Limitation of Armaments of 1921-22.
224. Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 223, art. 5, reprinted at 658.
225. Id. arts. 1, 3, 4, reprinted at 657-58.
226. SCHINLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 659.
227. Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 223, art. 6, reprinted at 658.
228. See Bernstein, The Law of Chemical Warfare, 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
889, 911-12 (1942).
229. Professors Thomas and Thomas point out that "just condemnation"
amounts to an opinion rather than to a legal condemnation. 2 THoMAs &
THoMAS, supra note 222, at 78.
230. See id.
231. The Washington Naval Treaty was the first treaty ratified by the
United States Senate limiting chemical warfare. Fuller, supra note 196, at 252.
232. See supra note 27.
233. See supra notes 30-70 and accompanying text (discussion of the language of and parties to the Geneva Protocol).

426

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:387

was a product of the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of
War, held at Geneva in 1925 under the auspicies of the League of
Nations.'" The Protocol incorporated the broad prohibitory language found in the World War I peace treaties and article V of
the Washington Naval Treaty. Adding to the Protocol's importance is "the slow but continuous increase over the years in the
23 5
number of states which have ratified or acceded" to it.
Analyses of the Protocol as a source of general international
law have focused first on whether and to what extent the Protocol
was declaratory of customary international law in 1925. There is
limited authority that the Protocol's prohibitions against chemical and bacteriological warfare were declaratory of the customary
rule of international law against poison and poisoned weapons
which was first codified in the 1899 and 1907 Hague regulations.2 6 The weight of authority, however, tends to view the Protocol more skeptically. One authority contends that no customary
rules prohibiting chemical or biological weapons existed in 1925
because biological weapons had not been developed and chemical
weapons were used extensively in World-War 1.237 The argument
suggesting that the terms of the Protocol and its many restrictive
reservations make the instrument far too contractual to be declaratory of custom remains more persuasive. 3 8 The Protocol is not a

codification of general international law for four reasons. First,
the binding effect of an agreement codifying customary rules
would not depend on each party's deposit of ratification. 2

9

Sec-

ond, a declaratory instrument would not limit its obligatory effect
234. 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 84-85.
235. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 103. About 30 states had ratified or acceded
by 1930. See SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 111-15 (list of ratifying or
acceding countries updated through 1972). By January 1, 1981, this number was
116. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 289.
236. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 147, at 38. Professor Tucker states

that the Protocol's prohibitions were broader than the customary law in 1925:
"The Protocol can be equated with such prior customary law only insofar as it
forbids gases and other chemicals that are either poisonous-or even if not poisonous-inflict unnecessary suffering or injury." Tucker, supra note 36, at 166-

67. Thus, he sees the principle of military necessity as implicit in the Protocol.
237. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 29.

238. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 93-96; Kelly, supra note
103, at 50; Neinast, supra note 20, at 29-32; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 29-32.
239. 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 93.
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to parties only.2 40 Third, many of the parties made reservations
which eliminate the reserving state's obligation to adhere to241the
If
Protocol once a party or a party's ally violates the Protocol.
the Protocol were declaratory of customary international law,
which continues to be binding despite violations, the reservations
would seem to "repeal" or have a "retrogressive effect" upon that
law.2 4 2 Finally, the Protocol's "extension" of the prohibition
243
against gas and analogous weapons to bacteriological weapons
implies that there was no customary or conventional rule prohibiting such weapons in 1925.244 Thus, the Geneva Protocol consti-

prohibiting first use of lethal or
tuted a new conventional24 rule
5

seriously injurious CBWs.
The second focus of debate is the significance and force of the
Geneva Protocol today 2 46 There is persuasive authority that all
the prior conventional prohibitions together with the Protocol's
prohibitions created a customary rule against first use of lethal or
seriously injurious chemical weapons.24 7 Other authorities contend that the Protocol alone is presently declaratory of or coextensive with a customary rule.2 48 A number of writers have distinguished the present force of the Protocol's bacteriological
prohibition from its chemical prohibition.4 9 In general, these au-

240. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 94.
241. See O'Brien, supra note 103, at 29-31.
242. Neinast, supra note 20, at 30. Professor O'Brien points out that there
was no need for parties to preserve by reservation their right of reprisal because
the right of reprisal is fundamental in the law of war. O'Brien, supra note 103,
at 30. This type of reservation in several cases goes beyond preserving the right
of reprisal because its "breach of contract" effect permits unlimited retaliation.
Id. O'Brien concludes that the Protocol "set up a new rule. . . between participating parties only." Id. at 31.
243. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 637.
244. J. STONE, supra note 61, at 557; Neinast, supra note 20, at 29.
245. See S. BAILEY, supra note 51, at 127; F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at
91; Mallison, supra note 103, at 328; Moore, supra note 36, at 454; Neinast,
supra note 20, at 32. The Protocol has never been interpreted to prohibit research, development, stockpiling, or transfer of the proscribed means of warfare.
See S. BAILEY, supra note 51, at 127; F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 92; Moore,
supra note 36, at 452.
246. Much of the debate arose over the Protocol's application to chemical
agents, herbicides, and tear gas which the United States used in the conflict in
Southeast Asia. See supra notes 36 and accompanying text.
247. See M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 354.
248. See 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 34; J. STONE, supra note 61, at 556.
249. See Mallison, supra note 103, at 327-28; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 55.
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thorities do not perceive the Protocol as having produced a customary rule against the use of biological weapons. Their pre-BWC
writings argue that the Protocol's bacteriological weapon proscription retains the same force it had in 1925: the Protocol prohibits the first use of biological weapons only among parties.2 50
Because biological weapons are a more recent technological development than chemical weapons, there is even less evidence of a
custom for the use of biological weapons. 5 1 In contrast, the minority views the Protocol as at least coextensive with a customary
rule against the first use of lethal chemical or biological weapons.25 2 This writer agrees with the authorities who argue that the
Protocol is a step in a developmental process-a part of an "accumulation" of conventional efforts which have become both
more comprehensive in their prohibitory scope and more specific
about the weapons covered in their prohibitions. Presently, the
Protocol is coextensive with a customary rule against the first use
of chemical weapons, which was the focus of previous conventional prohibitions. Because those conventions did not specifically
address bacteriological weapons, the "cumulative effect" of the
several agreements would not extend the Protocol's bacteriological prohibition beyond its significance in 1925: a conventional
prohibition forbidding the first use of bacteriological weapons
among parties to the Protocol, subject to the parties' respective
reservations.253
8. The Biological Weapons Convention
The possessory focus and comprehensive scope of the BWC2 "
make it the most forceful of all the conventional efforts to outlaw
CBWs. 25 ' Notwithstanding its own force, the BWC may also be

considered a step in the development of a prohibition of biological weapons under general international law. Thus, there may be
250. See M. McDouAL & F. FLICuNO, supra note 103, at 637; J. SToNE,
supra note 61, at 557; Mallison, supra note 103, at 328; O'Brien, supra note 103,
at 56.
251. See J. STONE, supra note 61, at 557; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 29.
252. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 34; see also Baxter & Buergenthal, supra
note 36, at 866-68. The latter writers view the Protocol as reaching beyond the
present customary law to proscribe nonlethal agents as well as lethal ones. Id.
253. For a discussion of the present application of the "bacteriological" ban
contained in the Protocol, see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 28.
255. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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a cumulative effect from the Protocol's bacteriological proscription and the BWC's broad biological-bacteriological-toxin proscription. It is uncertain, however, whether this effect expresses a
legal restraint or a moral restraint upon biological warfare. First,
the BWC has been in effect for a relatively short period of
time.256 Second, the BWC has been and is now being flagrantly
violated by states party to it. 257 Thus, the BWC's importance as a

source of a general international legal restraint on biological
weapons is uncertain. Nevertheless, the BWC, together with the
Geneva Protocol, does express the belief that biological weapons
condemned by the general opinion of the civi"have been justly
258
lized world."
9. Summary
The international agreements applicable to CBWs are sources
of a general international legal rule prohibiting the first use of
lethal or seriously injurious chemical weapons. First use of biological weapons is prohibited only among the parties to the Protocol
whereas any use of them is prohibited among the parties to the
BWC. The status of the BWC as a source of general international
law, however, remains uncertain.
C.

Custom

1. Introduction
The third source of international law to which the ICJ refers in
resolving a dispute brought before it is "[i]nternational custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.

'2 59

"Custom is...

law." 260

In the absence of a
the original source of international
pertinent treaty, customary law will be applicable.261
256. See supra note 101.
- 257. One of the violating parties, the U.S.S.R., was a chief sponsor. See infra
text accompanying note 370. The U.S.S.R. was one of 12 members of the United
Nations to agree to a draft of the BWC in the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament. See Moore, supra note 36, at 427.
258. See BWC, supra note 28, at 586, reprinted at 600.
259. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
260. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 25; see also H. KELSEN, supra note
166, at 438.
261. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[W]here there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
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International custom is a practice or usage that is followed because of a conviction that the practice or usage is obligatory.2 2
Consequently, two elements are required to form a customary
rule-the objective element, practice, and the subjective element,
but it
conviction.26 3 A practice need not be ancient in origin,
must be repeated over time;2 65 it need not be unanimous or uni-

versal, but it must be general.2 6 Conviction transforms a simple
practice into a recognized custom. The point at which a practice
2 7 evior usage evolves into a custom is a factual determination;
dence of the evolution into custom could be gathered from such

diverse sources as official acts, pronouncements and opinions,
manuals, and diplomatic correspondence.2 68
In the determination of customary law, three situations demand caution. First, a practice may continue with the appearance
of conviction when actually it is followed primarily for moral or
political reasons.2 69 Second, a country may refrain completely
from a practice, making a determination of conviction more diffi-

cult; this is particularly true regarding the methods of conducting
hostilities. 27 0 Third, although violations do not necessarily negate

must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations."); H. KELSEN, supra
note 166, at 438.
262. J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 59. A classic formulation is made by Judge
Lauterpacht: "International jurists speak of a custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up under the aegis of the conviction
that these actions are, according to International Law, obligatory or right." 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 25.
263. One scholar has termed the practice element the "material" aspect, and
the conviction element the "psychological aspect," or "opinio juris." J. STARKE,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (7th ed. 1972). Starke observes
"that the opinio juris is a matter of inference from all the circumstances." Id. at
41-42.
264. Kunz, The Nature of Customary InternationalLaw, 47 AM. J. INT'I. L.
662, 666 (1953).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 26. "Wherever and as soon as a line
of international conduct frequently adopted by States is considered legally obligatory or legally right, the rule which may be abstracted from such conduct is a
rule of customary International Law." Id.
268. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 61.
269. Kunz states that this phenomenon may be a "norm of international morality or a norm of courtoisie internationale,"but not a rule of customary international law. Kunz, supra note 264, at 667.
270. "[O]nly if such abstention [from instituting criminal proceedings] were
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the existence of a customary rule, the repeated commission of violations may evidence a new and different norm.27 1

Customary rules of the international law of war are binding
upon all states under all circumstances.21 2 Thus, customary rules

apply to states participating in declared wars and in armed27con3
flicts of a less formal and not purely international character. It
is generally recognized that customary rules also bind belligerent
27 4
participants that are not states, including insurgent groups.

Substantially all evidence regarding the behavior of nations indicates that there is a common aversion to the first use of lethal
or seriously injurious chemical and biological agents, even among
those with strong military capabilities. Lethal or seriously injurious CBWs rarely have been used and in most instances the party
employing them either attempted to justify or flatly denied their
based on their [the states] being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it
be possible to speak of an international custom." The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 9, at 28. This observation has led one authority to note that conviction is the more important element in the determination of customary law in the
area of weapons use. THoMAs & THoMAs, supra note 20, at 136.
271. See Kunz, supra note 264, at 668.
272. See J. STARKE, supra note 263, at 517; R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 32.
273. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 29-30; J. STARKE, supra note 263, at 517.
These authorities observe that the customary laws of war have been recognized
as applicable in the Vietnam Conflict, which was technically an intrastate conflict with an international character.
274. An insurgent group may be bound by the customary rules if it has been
recognized as a belligerent by other states. The traditional rule is that only full
sovereign states are legally qualified to make war and thus become belligerents.
2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 248. Because entities which are not full sovereign states may have the power, if not the legal qualifications, to make war, it
becomes necessary to rebognize these entities legally as belligerents when certain
conditions of fact are present(1) the existence of a civil war accompanied by a general state of
hostilities;
(2) occupation and a measure of orderly administration of a substantial
part of national territory by the insurgents;
(3) observance of the rules of warfare on the part of the insurgent forces
acting under a responsible authority;
(4) the practical necessity for third States to define their attitude to the
civil war.
Id. at 249. Thus, Oppenheim states that the customary rules bind "belligerents,"
meaning full sovereign states and entities qualifying as belligerents even though
not full sovereign states. Id. at 231. The SIPRI writers note that the fact "that
no prior explicit acceptance is required for a customary rule allows a somewhat
broader interpretation of the concept of a state." 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 29.
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use. Knowledge, or even suspicion, of a nation's use of CBWs
rarely fails to stimulate some international criticism. Certainly,
no state has ever claimed a right to first use of lethal or seriously
injurious CBWs. The following discussion traces the development
of custom with regard to CBWs.
2.

World War I

Germany generally is acknowledged to be the first user of lethal
or seriously injurious gas during World War J. 275 Although Germany's use of gas received widespread condemnation,7 the Allies, which at that time included only Great Britain and France,
made no formal protest to the German Government. 7 The German Government defended its use of gas by claiming a reprisal
against Allied first use, but the Allies firmly denied this charge. 7 8
Following these early accusations, the Germans and all the Allies,
including the United States, engaged in large scale gas warfare for
the remainder of the hostilities.27 9 Both the Allies and the
Germans considered gas a reprehensible weapon and each justified its own use on the grounds that the enemy's first and continuing use necessitated its retaliation in self-defense.2 0 Because
275. See, e.g., 1 J. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR § 180
(1920). This use occurred during the second battle of Ypres, France, on April 22,

1915. Id. For a detailed examination of World War I gas warfare, see 1 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: THE RISE OF CB WEAPONS 127-41 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as 1 SIPRI].
276. The use of gas was denounced in the British House of Lords and in the
British and United States press. 1 J. GARNER, supra note 275, § 182.
277. Kelly, supra note 103, at 37 n.171.
278. Prior to April 1915, both the Germans and French used tear gas, but
the Germans were the first to use lethal gas. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 222, at 157-58.
279. Japan apparently did not use gas during the first World War. See Kelly,
supra note 103, at 42. However, tactical rather than legal considerations may
explain Japan's decision not to use gas, for gas warfare was not as adaptable to
the Pacific area as it was to the trench warfare of Europe. Id.
280. For an insight into the justifications of both sides, see correspondence
involving the February 6, 1918, appeal (to all belligerent participants to stop

using gas) made by the International Committee of the Red Cross. DEPT OF
STATE, 1918 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 779-88 (1933) [hereinafter cited as 1918 FOREIGN RELATIONS]. This appeal, which asserted that the use
of gas violated the Hague Regulations against the use of poison or poisoned
weapons and against the use of means calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,
see supra text accompanying note 205, was the only formal protest made during
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each side recognized that the utilization of gas was a morally suspect method of warfare and because each side felt compelled to
legitimize its own use of gas, the major powers must have felt
some conviction that the use of chemical weaponry was illegal ex-

cept under the most exigent circumstances. It is possible, of
course, that these condemnations and justifications were rooted
more in fear of adverse world opinion than in genuine legal conviction.2 11 Nonetheless, political considerations may contribute to
or even be evidence of a customary norm. 2 The large scale use of
gas by both the Allied and Central Powers coupled with the lack
of a formal Allied protest against Germany's initial use of gas in-

dicate the weakness of any customary rule then in existence.28 3
World War I against the use of gas. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 23 n.61. The
French issued a joint Allied reply condemning gas as "cruel" but justified their
use of gas as "a means of protection... furnishing their armies equal offensive
instruments." See Telegram from Stovall to the Secretary of State (April 13,
1918), reprinted in 1918 FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra at 782-83. Germany replied
that gas was used because "a feeling of responsibility for its own people made it
impossible for the German military headquarters to renounce an effective if
dreadful means of warfare for the mere purpose of sparing the enemy sufferings
which the enemy itself was at that very time inflicting only too readily." See
Letter from Stovall to the Secretary of State (Sept. 24, 1918), reprinted in 1918
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra, at 788.
281. This conjecture may be especially applicable to the Germans when analyzed in terms of the traditional German theory of military necessity. German
military theory (Kriegsraison)emphasizes necessity over humanity. See genrally
O'Brien-1, supra note 110, at 117-28. Furthermore, the United States Army interpreted the Hague Regulation article 23 as not including chemical and gas
weapons in its proscription of poison or poisoned weapons and weapons which
cause unnecessary suffering. See 2 THoMAs & THOMAs, supra note 222, at 183.
Hague Regulation article 23(a) was, however, interpreted to prohibit poison or
poisoned weapons when those weapons were "means calculated to spread contagious diseases." U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, RULES OF LAND WARFRE, para. 177 (April
25, 1914, as corrected to April 15, 1917), quoted in Neinast, supra note 20, at 19.
Generally, the methods of gas dissemination during World War I did not violate the existing conventional prohibition of gas. The Hague Gas Declaration
prohibited projectiles whose sole object was to diffuse gas. See supra note 192
and accompanying text. The primary means of gas dissemination was by canister which released a cloud of gas carried by wind to enemy trenches. See 1 J.
GARNER, supra note 275, § 180.
282. See 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 103.
283. "[lIt would seem that the evidence shifts the scales toward a conclusion
either than [sic] no such rule was even in being or if it was it did not survive the
war. If there was such a rule it did nothing to restrain the use of gas." 2 THoMAs
& THoMAS, supra note 222, at 162.
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3. Between the World Wars
As a result of the public condemnation of gas warfare following
the First World War, specific prohibitions against chemical weapons were included in three international agreements: the peace
treaties,28 ' the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, 28" and the 1925
Geneva Protocol.28 6 The language of these agreements suggests

that chemical weapons, particularly gas, already were considered
illegal.287 Because the purpose of the World War I peace treaties
was to disarm the individual Central Power states, 288 however, the

peace treaties may not be indicative of international law on the
use of chemical weapons.
The arms limitation conference which produced the Washington Naval Treaty was convened upon the initiative of the United
States. 289 Although the Treaty never became effective, no objection to its chemical warfare prohibition was made. 290 The Treaty

was ratified by the United States,29 1 the United Kingdom, Italy,
and Japan. 9 2 Not long after the Treaty was signed, France sold
Japan gas manufacturing equipment and assisted in the initial
operation of Japanese plants.2" Additionally, in 1920 the United
States created the Chemical Warfare Service as a part of its
army.2 9 ' These two activities may indicate only a desire for

284. See supra text accompanying notes 215-21.
285. See supra text accompanying note 223.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 35-44.
287. See 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 104.
288. See Moore, supra note 36, at 431.
289. Bernstein, supra note 228, at 911. The initiative was provided by Secretary of State Hughes. Id.
290. See supra text accompanying note 228.
291. Division of opinion existed among the United States military command
and other representatives at the conference on the chemical warfare prohibition.

Much controversy focused on whether the treaty's ban would include nonlethal
agents, such as tear gas, in addition to lethal agents. The "total prohibition"
approach prevailed, and none of the other delegations sought to exclude tear gas
from the coverage of article V. It is not certain, however, whether the treaty

reflected any conviction about what the law was or what it should be. The
United States Senate unanimously ratified the treaty without substantial discussion of the issue of lethal/nonlethal coverage. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 222, at 184-85; Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 860; Moore, supra

note 36, at 432-33.
292. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 659.

293. Bernstein, supra note 228, at 912.
294. Id. at 909-10. The service was established despite strong opinion against
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preparedness and not a belief in the legality of chemical weapons.
Even so, if the major powers believed that chemical weapons were
illegal, these practices demonstrate that their conviction may not
have been very strong.
The United States delegation to the 1925 Geneva Conference
also initiated the adoption process for the Geneva Protocol. " " Of
the major powers represented at the conference, only Japan and
the United States failed to ratify the Protocol.29 It is not clear
why Japan did not ratify,297 but commentators concluded that the
United States Senate did not ratify the Protocol for three reasons: (1) it doubted the inhumanness of gas; (2) it feared the Protocol would prohibit the use of tear gas in war; and (3) it was
affected by domestic isolationist sentiment.9 8
gas among the public and some members of the United States military command. Two possible reasons may be the effectiveness of gas as a weapon and the
perceived need for preparedness. 2 THOMAS & THoMAs, supra note 222, at 184.
295. Secretary of State Kellog instructed the delegation:
[T]he Department would desire to see an article inserted absolutely
prohibiting international trade in asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases
for use in war. In this connection you will recall that the Treaty between
the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, signed on February 6, 1922, contained in Article 5, a prohibition against the use of such
gases. This Treaty, it may be noted, is not yet effective as it has not been
ratified by France. However, as this Government and various other governments are clearly committed to the principle that poisonous gases should
not be used in warfare, there is every reason for you to press for the inclusion of an article prohibiting the shipment of such gases in foreign trade
for possible use in time of war.
1 DEP'T OF STATE, 1925 FoRmoN RELATIONS OF THE UNrrED STATES 35-36 (1940).
Secretary Kellog recommended a provision which incorporated the language of
article V of the Washington Naval Treaty, but also proscribed the export of
chemical weapons. Id. at 36. These instructions imply that the United States
believed chemical weapons should be an illegal means of conducting hostilities,
but did not view them as a means already deemed illegal. One early commentator suggested that the Protocol was only an expression of the "sentiment of the
delegates." Bernstein, supra note 239, at 914; see also Baxter & Buergenthal,
supra note 36, at 861; Moore, supra note 36, at 433.
296. Japan eventually ratified the Protocol in 1970. ScHNDLR & ToMAN,
supra note 27, at 112. The United States ratified the Protocol in 1975. TEATms
IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 116.
297. Perhaps Japan thought that ratification of the Protocol was inconsistent
with its operation of gas manufacturing plants. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
298. For a full discussion, see Bunn, supranote 40, at 378; Fuller, supranote
196, at 264; Moore, supra note 36, at 433-34. The discussion at the Geneva Con-
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Many parties to the Protocol, including the United Kingdom,
France, and the Soviet Union, restricted their obligations reciprocally through the use of reservations. 29' Because of these reciprocal restrictions, commentators are hesitant to conclude that the
Protocol was declaratory of custom in 1925.300
Italy, a nonreserving party to the Protocol, 30 1 generally is identified as the first country to use lethal gas after the Protocol's
adoption. During 1935 and 1936 Italy waged war against Ethiopia,
another nonreserving party to the Protocol.3 02 Italian armed
303
forces used gas against Ethiopian armed forces and villages.
Significantly, Italy did not assert a right to first use. Initially, the
Italian Government denied press reports of gas warfare. Later Italy claimed its use of gas was a reprisal against allegedly unlawful

Ethiopian acts of war.804 The Italian Government asserted that it
had complied with the Geneva Protocol because the Protocol did

not restrict a state's right to reprisal against illegal acts of war. 5
Italy's rationalization of its behavior may have been merely an
effort to combat negative world opinion. Italy's excuse is weakened, however, because the Ethiopian armed forces were neither
as sophisticated nor as well-equipped as those of Mussolini.
Whatever the legal merits of Italy's justification, Italy's attempt
to vindicate itself demonstrates that the country recognized at

least some restraint upon the use of chemical weapons.3 06 The ex-

ference did not focus upon the exact prohibitory scope of the Protocol. See Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 36, at 861.
299. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 93-96. Professor
O'Brien characterizes the Protocol as having a "strictly contractual caste."
O'Brien, supra note 103, at 31.
301. See SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 112.
302. Id. at 111.
303. For a detailed account, see 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at
102-63. The Italians were the first to disseminate poison gas by spraying it from
airplanes. Id. at 163.
304. Id.; 1 SIPRI, supra note 275, at 143. The Italian Government charged
the Ethiopians with torturing and killing captives, disfiguring wounded and
dead Italians, and killing noncombatants. Id.
305. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 344 n.1; 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 222, at 163-64.
306. Indeed, Professor O'Brien notes that the Italian, use of gas was an "aberration": "[N]o one seriously contended that the generally condemned act had
any relevance to other nations and other wars." O'Brien, supra note 103, at 3334; see also 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 107.
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tent to which the Italian Government supported a customary rule
against the use of chemical weapons is unclear, because it failed
3 07
to consider its own use of gas as a violation of the Protocol.
The Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan reportedly began serious research in biological weapons during the 1930s. 3 0 Japan was
accused of using gas and biological warfare against China before
and during World War II, but these charges were not fully substantiated. The allegations were framed as violations of international agreements to which Japan was a party, not as violations of
international custom.3 0 9
During the period between the world wars, nations used the
customary rules both to justify their use of CBWs and to accuse
others of using CBWs illegally. More optimistically, the limited
instances of CBW use during this period may evidence a growing
inclination to abstain from the use of CBWs and to recognize
some customary legal limit permitting CBW use only in special
circumstances.
4.

World War II

There are no conclusive reports establishing the use of CBWs
during the Second World War. 10 This lack of conclusive information seems to confirm the growing disinclination to use CBWs.
Whether this practice of abstention stemmed from a conviction as
to a customary rule is not entirely clear, but some customary legal
restraint seems to have emerged.
The abstention did not result from any inability to use
CBWs.3 11 A joint Anglo-French statement made at the beginning
of the war declared the intention of the two states to abide by the
307. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 164. The prohibitions of the Protocol were
incorporated in the 1938 Italian War Regulations which state that compliance is
dependent upon conventional reciprocity. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at
343 n.3.
308. Neinast, supra note 20, at 4.
309. See 2 THoMAs & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 164-66; Kelly, supra note
103, at 13; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 33-34 & nn.89 & 90.
Japan was not bound by the Geneva Protocol. Japan may not have felt pro-

hibited from using CBWs by the pre-World War I agreements or by custom.
310. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 195, at 193. The reports include the charges
against Japan. See supranotes 308-09 and accompanying text. For other unsubstantiated reports of the use of gas, see J. SPAIGHT, supra note 195, at 193-94.
311. "All of the belligerents stood ready to engage in gas warfare ...
O'Brien, supra note 103, at 34-35.
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provisions of the Geneva Protocol, but reserved the right to take
any action necessary if the enemy did not also abstain.3 12 Germany replied with a similar pledge,313 but Japan replied without
pledging compliance.314 Churchill responded to reports that the
Germans were prepared to use gas by repeatedly warning that if
the Germans used gas, the British would retaliate with large scale
gas warfare." 5 The United States, having begun biological warfare research in 1941,311 also indicated it was prepared to retaliate
in kind,31 7 if the enemy used gas.31 " After Germany surrendered,
312. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 195, at 193. The declaration was issued on September 2, 1939. Id.
313. Id.
314. Bunn, supra note 40, at 382.
315. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 195, at 194-95. Churchill did not phrase his
threat in terms of legitimate reprisal. He once spoke of inflicting "tenfold retaliation" upon Germany in the event the latter used gas. Id. at 195. Churchill was
convinced that the threat of retaliation kept the Germans from using gas. Id.
316. Brungs, supra note 20, at 68. The United States Army manual of 1940
repeated the 1914 manual's provisions that Hague Regulation article 23(a), see
supra text accompanying note 205, extended to the "use of means calculated to

spread contagious disease."

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL

27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE, para. 28 (1940), quoted in Brungs, supra note
20, at 19. The British Manual of Military Law of 1929 contained a similar provision. Id. at 20.
317. See Bernstein, supra note 289, at 914-15.
318. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 195, at 195; Bunn, supra note 40, at 382.
Roosevelt avoided mentioning the Protocol because the United States and Japan
were not parties. The following is an excerpt from a June 8, 1943, statement:
Use of such weapons [poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices] has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This
country has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to
use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort
to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.
We promise to any perpetrators of such crimes [resort to the use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare] full and
swift retaliation in kind ....

Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore,

will immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives ....
Roosevelt, Use of Poison Gas, 8 Dep't St. Bull. 507, 507 (1943). This may be the
origin of a United States policy of "no first use" of CBWs. Kelly, supra note 103,
at 35; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 35. The United States Army's 1940 manual
stated: "The practice of recent years has been to regard the prohibition against
the use of poison [Hague Regulation article 23(a)] as not applicable to the use of
toxic gases." UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 316, at 7, quoted in
Kelly, supra note 103, at 44 n.202. The "practice" referred to may have been the
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the United States considered and rejected the use of gas or antiplant bacteriological warfare against the Japanese to bring the
war to a swift conclusion.319
The general abstention from using gas warfare by all the belligerent participants may be attributed to the fear of retaliation.32 0
Hitler's personal objection to the use of chemical weapons resulted from his exposure to gas as a soldier in World War I and is
also cited as a reason for Germany's abstention.32 1 Tactical considerations also may have induced abstention.2 2 Certainly, both
sides anticipated that world opinion would condemn the first
party to use CBWs. Finally, all those participating in the war,
except for the United States and Japan, were parties to the Geneva Protocol. Thus, the Protocol also may have served as a restraint against the use of gas. Compliance with the Geneva Protocol in such a major conflict is significant,3 23 especially considering
two of the major powers were not parties. Because the only sanction for violation of the Protocol was the risk of retaliation, compliance may have been based more upon fear than upon conviction as to a legal restraint. 324 Even so, a practice which results

use of gas by Italy or its alleged use by Japan. See supra notes 303, 309-10 and
accompanying text.
319. See Brungs, supra note 20, at 69 & n.122; Bunn, supra note 40, at 382.
Professor Bunn attributes the ultimate rejection of the idea largely to
"[p]ersonal and institutional distaste... among military men.. . ." Id.
320. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 195, at 195-96; 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note

222, at 168-69.
321.- 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 168. But see S. SEAGRAVE,
supra note 40, at 230:
Although it was Adolph Hitler's personal revulsion for poison gas, as much
as anything else, that kept Germany from using its nerve gases. ..
constant readiness of the British and American chemical corps ...

,

the
did

much to convince the German general staff and Hitler that the Allies also
had nerve gas and were prepared to use it on Germany in retaliation.
Indeed, Hitler's repugnance for lethal chemical agents was not strong enough to
prevent him from killing millions of civilian noncombatants with gas.
322. Unfavorable climate in Africa, Italy, and Russia; difficult physical terrain; and great distances between production centers and employment locations
were considerations which may have reduced the tactical advantage of using
CBWs. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 168-69.
323. Professors Thomas and Thomas deem this fact "astonishing." Id. at
169. Professor O'Brien calls it "remarkable." O'Brien, supra note 103, at 36.
324. Professor Stone comments that the abstention was probably primarily
"due to a special combination of circumstances rendering threat of reprisals unusually efficacious." J. STONE, supra note 61, at 556.
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from the threat of legal sanction is no less significant legally than
a practice observed because of "a deep respect for the law."' 2 5
Whatever their motivation, the actions of states during World
War II may evidence the emergence of a customary rule against

first use of CBWs.
5. The Korean Conflict
None of the belligerent participants in the Korean Conflict
used CBWs.' 26 The United States military was capable of using
chemical weapons, but refrained from doing so, despite the potential tactical advantage which might have been achieved. 2 7 China
and North Korea accused the United States of employing germ
warfare, but these charges were denied 2 8 and never substantiated.2 9 In June 1952 the United States again declined to become
325. O'Brien, supra note 103, at 36 (discussing legal sanctions). This may be
particularly appropriate in the case of the law of war, in which custom is often
overtly evidenced by abstention. As Professor Tucker observes:
It is of course true that in the absence of a system of international inspection and control of prohibited weapons, the effectiveness of the rule forbidding poisonous or asphyxiating gases must depend largely upon the expectation of states that resort to these weapons will provoke retaliation in
kind from an opponent. It is not easy to understand, however, why this
fact should be considered as an argument against the position that resort
to poisonous or asphyxiating gases is now prohibited in law. The threat of
retaliation, or reprisal, must provide a decisive factor in leading to the observance of the whole of the law regulating the conduct of war. Yet it has
seldom been contended that to the extent that this law is dependent for
its observance upon the threat of reprisal it is thereby deprived of its
validity.
R. TUCKER, supra note 103, at 53 (footnotes omitted).
326. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 36, at 437.
327. The use of gas may have been tactically advantageous because the front
was fairly narrow and the United States was better prepared to employ chemical
weapons than North Korea or China. 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at
170; Kelly, supra note 103, at 14; Moore, supra note 36, at 437. Some United
States frontline commanders requested but were refused permission to use gas
to flush enemy soldiers from fortifications. 2 THOMAS & THoMAs, supranote 222,
at 170; Bunn, supra note 40, at 383; Moore, supra note 36, at 437.
328. "We will not commit aggression with chemical weapons or bacteriological weapons, which we have been falsely and slanderously accused of using."
Acheson, Achieving the Goals of the Charter,27 DEP'T ST. BULL. 639, 641 (1952)
(statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 16, 1952).
329. In 1952 the United States invited the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to investigate the charges. North Korea and China would not
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a party to the Geneva Protocol. 33 0 This restraint, exercised even
though the United States had no obligation to do so under the
Protocol, may evidence an United States conviction for a customary rule against CBWs.3 3 1 The United States policy during the

Korean Conflict appears to continue Roosevelt's "no first use"
policy. 3 2 Use of this policy in Korea can be traced to a combination of considerations: fear of retaliation in kind from the Soviet
Union, fear of escalation, fear of adverse international reaction to
a first use, scrutiny by the United Nations, and the limited objectives of the conflict.33 3 Nevertheless, the obvious restraint 33 4 from
using CBWs during a conflict of considerable proportion demonstrates some conviction that first use would invite legal sanctions.
Even if the abstention was based largely on political considerations, the practice may indicate a continuation of a developing
customary rule against CBW first use. 35

cooperate so no inquiry was made. See 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF

INTERNA-

461-62 (1968). Subsequently, the Soviet Union blocked by veto a
United Nations Security Council draft resolution requesting the ICRO to investigate the charges and report to the Security Council. Id. at 465. In 1953 the
United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution proposing that a multistate commission investigate and report back to the General Assembly. The investigation was contingent upon acceptance by all of the governments involved.
North Korean communist authorities and China refused to accept. Id. at 465-66.
330. The Soviet Union proposed in June 1952 that the Security Council
adopt a resolution calling upon all states not yet members to ratify or accede to
the Protocol. The resolution focused upon the condemnation of bacterial warfare. Id. at 463. The United States representative responded by pointing out the
inadequacies of the Protocol: the restrictive Soviet reservation, the Protocol's
failure to prohibit production or stockpiling, and the need for agreement upon
elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Id. at 463-64. The resolution failed
despite the Soviet Union's emphasis on the Protocol's "binding power." Id. at
465. During the following month the People's Republic of China formally recognized as binding the China's 1929 accession to the Protocol.
331. The United States was bound by the 1907 Hague Regulations, which
were interpreted by the 1940 Army manual to prohibit the spreading of contagious diseases. See supra note 316; SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 91.
332. See supra notes 318 & 328 (Secretary Acheson's statement that the
United States would not commit "aggression" with CBWs).
333. See Kelly, supra note 103, at 14; Moore, supra note 36, at 438.
334. One authority states that the United States fear of retaliation was based
upon speculation that the Soviet Union would supply North Korea and China
with CBWs. 1 SIPRI, supra note 275, at 158.
335. See supranotes 323-25 and accompanying text. The emphasis placed by
the Soviet Union upon the Geneva Protocol, however, undermines the notion of
a customary rule in the 1950s. This emphasis on a conventional restraint could
TIONAL LAW
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During the years following the Korean Conflict, the United
States seemed to indicate it was changing its position concerning
the use of CBWs, an issue the United States appeared to address
as a policy matter rather than as a legal concern. A 1956 army
manual pointed out the binding effect of Hague Regulation article
23(a) on the United States, 3 but declared that "the United
States is not a party to any treaty, now in force, that prohibits or
restricts the use in warfare of toxic or nontoxic gases, of smoke or
incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare. 3 37 Hints of
possible changes in United States CBW policy led Congressman
Kastenmaier to introduce in the House of Representatives a resolution affirming an official "no first use" policy.3 ' The resolution
failed.33 Although the language in the army manual and the rebe a manifestation of the Soviets' skepticism regarding custom and their preference for convention: "In contemporary conditions the principal means of creating norms of international law is a treaty. This is the point of view held by a
great majority, if not by all, of the Soviet authors who have treated this subject." Tunkin, Co-existence and InternationalLaw, [1958] 3 RECUEIL DES COURS
5, 23.
336. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, para. 37 (1956), discussed in Kelly, supra note 103, at 44 n.202.
337. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, para. 38 (1956), reprinted in W. BIsHoP, supra note 70, at 969. The
manual notes that two pertinent treaties, the Washington Naval Treaty and the
Geneva Protocol, were not binding because the former failed to become effective
and because the latter failed to receive United States ratification. See id. The
Navy manual included a similarly worded disclaimer and went on to express
doubt about the existence of a customary rule:
Although the use of such weapons [gas or bacteriological] frequently has
been condemned by states, including the United States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established by treaty, a
state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their use. However,
it is clear that the use of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons may be
considered justified against an enemy who first resorts to the use of those
weapons.
UNITED

STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE,

para. 612b

(1955), reprinted in R. TuCKER, supra note 103, at 410.
338. H.R. Res. No. 433, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 105 CONG.
REC. 10,824 (1959).
339. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 195. The Departments of
State and Defense stressed the defense needs and implied that such a policy
might not be judicious without conventional agreements and controls. Id. Partial
responsibility for the failure of the resolution stems from President Eisenhower's official opposition. When President Eisenhower was asked at a January
1960 press conference about a possible change in United States policy regarding
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jection of the resolution seem to indicate little United States conviction for a customary rule, the United States never asserted,
even in the army and navy manuals, a right to first use, 4 0 and the
Roosevelt "no first use" policy was never altered explicitly. 41
Whatever change did take place might be attributed to Cold War
distrust, which likely inhibited the growth of a genuine conviction
for a customary rule.
Despite these later developments, the Korean Conflict period
strengthened the custom that emerged from World War II. The
facts. remain that CBWs were not employed during the Korean
Conflict, and no state asserted a right to first use.
6.

The Yemen Civil War

The United Arab Republic (UAR) was charged with using lethal gas against royalist villages and troops during the Yemen
Civil War.34 2 Press reports accused the UAR of using gas and
speculated that the Soviet Union was behind the operation.3 4 3 Al34
though the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
confirmed this use of gas, the UAR denied the charges.3 4 5 Two
hundred members of the British House of Commons signed a motion deploring the UAR's use of gas and requesting the British
Government to bring the issue before the United Nations.3 4 The

CBWs, he replied that "no official suggestion has been made to me, and so far as
my own instinct is concerned, it is not to start such a thing first." 1960-1961
PuB. PAPERS 29 (1961), reprinted in Moore, supra note 36, at 439.
340. See Neinast, supranote 20, at 8. British, French, and West German law
of war manuals during the 1950s mentioned only the Geneva Protocol without
any indication that a customary rule operated independently to proscribe CBW
use. See generally Brungs, supra note 20, at 74-75.
341. In 1960 Major Kelly wrote that "the policy of retaliation enunciated by
Roosevelt is yet with the United States." Kelly, supra note 103, at 36.
342. See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1963, at 7, col. 1. A United Nations observer
team failed to find evidence of gas attack. Id., July 16, 1963, at 13, col. 2. Royalist officials and the Saudi Arabian Government, which was backing the royalists,
accused the UAR of using lethal gas in 1967. See id., Jan. 14, 1967, at 4, col. 3;
id., Jan. 24, 1967, at 4, col. 5.
343. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, chap. VI, n.110.
344. An ICRC investigating team confirmed this use of lethal gas and appealed to both sides to discontinue its use. See id., July 28, 1967, at 1, col. 3; 10
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 329, at 474-75 (reprints the ICRC statement of June
2, 1967).
345. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1967, at 6, col. 1.
346. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1967, at 5, col. 1.
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United States stated that the use of poison gas is a violation of
international law and requested that the matter be brought to the
attention of the United Nations. 4
The use of gas in Yemen was never brought before the United
Nations due to the Arab-Israeli situation. 348 The condemnations

by the United States and the United Kingdom may have resulted
more from the states' earlier vote to adopt a United Nations resolution reaffirming the Geneva Protocol 49 than from their convictions for a customary rule. Nevertheless, the adoption of the resolution, the condemnation of first use by two major powers, and
the denial by the accused state, which had voted for the resolution, manifested an agreement that the UAR's use of gas was a
condemnable deviation from a longstanding practice of no first
use. s50 Any customary rule against the use of CBWs was clearly
weakened by the UAR's violation and the failure of other states
to seek enforcement'of the rule. 51 Because of the nearly unani347. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur
Goldberg, expressed these sentiments in a letter to Congressman Wolff, who had
requested investigation of the charges against the UAR. Letter from Ambassador Goldberg to Congressman Wolff (July 24, 1967), reprinted in 10 M. WHMMAN, supra note 329, at 476-77. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the United
States position on gas use "corresponds to the stated policy of almost all other
governments throughout the world as reflected in the voting (91 in favor and 4
abstentions) on [United Nations General Assembly] Resolution 2162B of 1966
which condemned the use of poison gas in warfare." 10 M. WHrrMAN, supra
note 329, reprintedat 476. This resolution, adopted on December 5, 1966, by the
United Nations General Assembly, "calls for strict observance by all States of
the principles and objectives of the [Geneva] Protocol. . ., condemns all actions
contrary to these objectives" and invites all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 166. No state opposed the resolution, and only
four states abstained (Albania, Cuba, France, and Gabon). Id. Ambassador
Goldberg stated that the "use of poison gases is clearly contrary to international
law. .. ." 10 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 329, at 476.
348. The United States did not bring the matter before the United Nations
because of the delicate status of United States-UAR relations after the Six Day
War. The same event prevented Saudi Arabia from pursuing the matter. See 2
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 176.
349. See supra note 347.
350. Whether the UAR considered itself bound by the Protocol is not certain. Egypt was a party at the time, but Syria and Yemen were not. See SCMNDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 111, 114-15. For a discussion of this issue, see 2
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 100-02. The Protocol by its terms only
applies between parties. See supra text accompanying note 30.
351. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 176. The international society's failure to respond may reflect the emergence of Third World power and
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mous United Nations resolution adopted the year before, the
UAR persisted in its denials, realizing that any substantiation of
the charges would bring along some type of sanction. That realization was evidence that the customary rule against first use of
CBWs was not significantly harmed by the rule's violation in
Yemen.
7.

The Vietnam Conflict to the Present

Increased CBW disarmament ddring and after the Vietnam
Conflict demonstrated the increased strength of the customary
rule against CBWs. Although the United States admitted using
tear gas and herbicides in the Vietnam Conflict, 52 it repeatedly
maintained that the use of those agents was proscribed by neither
international law nor the Geneva Protocol. 353 The United Nations
the power of the oil-producing states, who were aligned against Israel and behind the UAR. If the Soviet Union was behind the UAR's use of gas, the Soviets
naturally would not have voiced condemnation, nor would allies or proxy states
have sought enforcement of international law against the UAR.
352. Communist authorities early in the conflict charged the United States
with the use of chemical agents. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1964, at 2, col. 5. On
March 23, 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara issued a statement explaining that South Vietnamese police and military forces were equipped with
riot control agents similar to those used by police and military forces all over the
world. Statement of Robert McNamara (July 31, 1964), reprinted in 10 M.
WHITEMAN, supra note 329, at 470. The next day Secretary of State Dean Rusk
explained that riot control agents such as tear gas were being used in Vietnam to
flush enemy forces in order to avoid injury to noncombatants. Id., reprinted at
470-73. Secretary Rusk prefaced his explanation:
We are not embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam. There has been no
policy decision to engage in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. We are not talking
about agents or weapons that are associated with gas warfare in the military arsenals of many countries. We are not talking about gas that is prohibited by the Geneva convention of 1925 or any other understandings
about the use of gas.
Id., reprinted at 470-71.
The United States used antiplant agents, or herbicides, primarily for defoliation of dense jungles. For a full discussion, see Moore, supra note 36, at 439-44;
1 SIPRI, supra note 275, at 162-85. In 1966 Hungary submitted a draft resolution in the United Nations General Assembly, calling for "absolute compliance"
with the Geneva Protocol by all states, citing United States activities in Vietnam as a recent example of violation. Statement by the Hungarian Representative Csatorday to the First Committee of the General Assembly, Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Nov. 11, 1966), reprinted in UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 734-40 (1966).
353. See, e.g., Statement by United States Arms Control and Disarmament
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General Assembly adopted a resolution in late 1966 calling for
"strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of
the Protocol. ' 354 The United States supported the resolution, but
made it clear that it did not interpret the Protocol as prohibiting
riot control and herbicide agents 55 At the Geneva Disarmament
Conference of 1969, the Soviet Union stressed the need for uniDirector Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly (Nov. 14, 1966),
reprinted in UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT 74047.
The Geneval Protocol does not apply to all gases, and it certainly does not
prohibit the use of simple tear gas where necessary to avoid injury to innocent persons. It is unreasonable to contend that any rule or international
law prohibits the use in military combat against any enemy of non-toxic
chemical agents that Governments around the world commonly use to control riots by their own peoples .... Reference was also made to the use of
herbicides in Viet-Nam. These materials involve the same chemicals and
have the same effect as those commonly used in the United States and a
great many other countries to clear weeds and control vegetation. Contrary
to the insinuations of the representative of Hungary, they are not bacteriological weapons; nor is their use contrary to international law.
Id., reprinted at 742, 743-44.
354. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2162B (XXI), adopted
Dec. 5, 1966, reprintedin 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 166-67. The resolution was
an amended version of the draft introduced by Hungary. See supra note 352.
Deputy United States Representative Nabut explained that the United States
supported the amended resolution because the amendments removed "tendentious language which was too easily subject to contention, misinterpretation, and
distortion." Statement by United States Representative Nabut to the General
Assembly, Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Dec. 5, 1966), reprintedin
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, DOcuMENTs

ON DISARMAMENT

800-02

(1966)

[hereinafter cited as Nabut Statement]. Ambassador Nabut was referring to the
language of the Hungarian draft which required "absolute compliance," compared with "strict observance." See supra note 352.
355. Nabut Statement, supra note 354, reprinted at 801. Ambassador Nabut
also recounted the United States practice of abstention since World War I and
quoted President Roosevelt's "no first use" policy. Id., reprinted at 801-02.
Two letters indicate United States convictions on what the customary rule
was. The first is a letter from Ambassador Goldberg to Congressman Wolff in
which Ambassador Goldberg stated: "The use of gas is clearly contrary to international law. . . ." See supra note 347. The second letter, dated December 22,
1967, from Assistant Secretary of State William B. Macombe to Congressman
Rosenthal, in which Macombe stated that the "rule" of the Protocol "has been
so widely accepted over a long period of time that it is now considered to form a
part of customary international law." Letter from Assistant Secretary Macombe
to Congressman Rosenthal (Dec. 22, 1967), quoted in Bunn, supra note 40, at
384-85.
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versal acceptance of the Protocol,3 58 and the United Kingdom
3 57
On
submitted a draft of a treaty banning biological weapons.

November 25, 1969, President Nixon redefined United States
CBW policy by announcing that the United States:
(1) Reaffirms its ...

renunciation of the first use of lethal chemi-

cal weapons.
(2) Extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating
chemicals.
(3) Renounces the use of lethal biological agents and weapons and
all other methods of biological warfare.
(4) [W]ill confine its biological research 3to58 defensive measures,
such as immunization and safety measures.

President Nixon also announced that he would submit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification and that the United
States would support the United Kingdom's draft of the biological weapons treaty.35 9 Furthermore, on February 14, 1970, President Nixon extended the United States' ban on biological weapons to toxins.38 0
356. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1969, at 4, col. 1.
357. Id., July 11, 1969, at 10, col. 4. The British representative at the conference explained that the United Kingdom was pursuing a ban on biological weapons but not on all CBWs because an agreement on the former was "more urgent" and would be easier to obtain. Id.
358. Nixon, Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs, 61
DFP'T ST. BULL. 541, 541 (1969) (statement by President Nixon). The President
justified his "no use" policy for biological weapons by stating: "Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences.
They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations." Id.
359. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1969, at 16, col. 1.
360. U.S. Renounces Use of Toxins as a Method of Warfare, 62 DEm'T ST.
BULL. 226, 226-27 (1970). The announcement attempted to clear up some of the
confusion over the classification of toxins. The British felt that although their
draft biological weapon treaty did not specifically cover toxins, toxins were
banned because the draft banned the production and possession of bacteria
from which toxins could be produced. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1969, at 20, col. 1.
Defense Secretary Laird and the State Department interpreted toxins to be a
chemical warfare agent. Id. The announcement of February 14, 1970, categorized
toxins as biological agents when recognizing that although toxins are "chemical
substances" and not contagious or capable of reproducing, "the production of
toxins in any significant quantity would require facilities similar to those needed
for the production of biological agents." U.S. Renounces Use of Toxins as a
Method of Warfare, 62 DEP'T ST. BULL. 226, 226 (1970); see also N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1970, at 1, col. 8. The United States representative at the 1970 Geneva
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On December 16, 1969, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution which interpreted the Geneva Protocol to
embody "the generally recognized rules of international law
prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical
developments." 361 The resolution was adopted by a vote of eighty
to three, with thirty-six absentions. 62 The United States opposed
the resolution because it included riot control and herbicide
agents within the Protocol's prohibition and because it erroneously interpreted the Protocol to be a "no use" as opposed to a
"no first use" rule. 63
Secretary of State William P. Rogers recommended 364 that
President Nixon submit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate with a
reservation permitting retaliatory use of chemical agents.365 President Nixon sent the Protocol with Secretary Rogers' reservation
Disarmament conference proposed that the United Kingdom's drafted biological
weapon ban include toxins. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1970, at 4, col. 4.
361. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2603A (XXIV), reprinted
in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 125-26.
362. See SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 126-27. The United States,
Portugal, and Australia were opposed. The states in favor included Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, Yemen, the UAR, the Soviet Union, the Iron Curtain states, and the
majority of Third World states. Id. The states abstaining included China,
France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, and the United Kingdom. Id.
363. See Moore, supra note 36, at 445.
364. Geneva Protocol on Gases and Bacteriological Warfare Submitted to
the Senate, 63 DEP'T ST. BULL. 273, 273-75 (1970).
365. Id. at 274. Secretary Rogers stated:
[T]he said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the
United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, in regard to
an enemy State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the
Prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.
Id. Unlike the restrictive reservations of France, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union, Secretary Rogers' recommended reservation does not limit the applicability of the Protocol only to parties and does not reserve the right to retaliate with bacteriological agents. Id. According to the United States, the Protocol's bacteriological method ban covers all biological agents including toxins. Id.
In summary, Secretary Rogers recommended that the United States become a
party "to strengthen the general prohibitions on the use of chemical warfare
and biological warfare and to facilitate our participation in the formulation of
new arms control provisions in this area." Id. (emphasis added). Also, the
United States interpretation of the Protocol would permit the use of riot control

and herbicide agents in war. Id. at 274.
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37
to the Senate on August 19, 1970.366 After considerable debate,
the Senate unanimously consented to ratification of the Protocol
with the reservation on December 16, 1974.368 Thus, the United
States was the last major power to become a party to the Geneva

Protocol.36 9
At the 1971 Geneva Disarmament Conference, a twelve state
committee that included the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union, agreed on a revised draft of the BWC
which banned biological weapons.s7a The United Nations General
Assembly commended the draft 71 and urged the Geneva Conferees to negotiate a similarly comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.3 7 2 Additionally, the United Nations requested all member

states to refrain from further development, production, or stockpiling of lethal chemical agents until such an agreement could be
reached. 37 3 The Soviet Union also wanted the BWC to include a

366. Id. at 273.
367. See Moore, supra note 36, at 423-26. The debate focused chiefly on
whether the United States would interpret the Protocol to permit the use of riot
control and herbicide agents in war. Id. Ratification was made possible when the
Ford Administration's Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Dr. Fred C. Ikl6, offered a compromise interpretation: (1) renunciation of first
use of herbicides in war except to clear landing strips and military perimeters,
and (2) renunciation of first use of riot control agents except in "defensive military roles to save lives." N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
368. 120 CONG. REc. 40,068 (1974); see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1974, at 7,
col. 1. President Ford signed the ratification papers on January 22, 1975. Id.,
Jan. 23, 1974, at 2, col. 4.
369. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification on April 10,
1975. See Ford, Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological Weapons Convention,
72 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 576, 577 n.2 (1975) (statement of President Ford); TREATIES
IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 289.
370. See Leonard, Geneva Disarmament Conference Agrees on Draft Text
of Bacteriological Weapons Convention, 65 DEP'T ST.-BuLL. 504, 504 (1971);
N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
371. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2826, Dec. 16, 1971, reprinted in Bush, U.N. Commends Biological Weapons Convention and Requests Continued Negotiation on Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons, 66 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 102, 107-08 (1971). This resolution was adopted by a vote of 110 to 0,
with France the only abstention. Moore, supra note 36, at 427.
372. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2827A, reprinted in 66
DEP'T ST. BuLL. 108-09 (1971) (adopted by a vote of 110 to 0, with one
abstention).
373. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2827B, reprinted in 66
DEP'T ST. BULL. 109 (1971) (adopted by a vote of 101 to 0, with 10 abstentions).
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ban on chemical weapons, 374 but its proposal never received sufficient support.7 5 The BWC opened for signature on April 10,
1972,378 and entered into force on March 26, 1975.377 Subse-

quently, in the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1976, the
United States proposed a chemical weapons ban similar to the
BWC ban on biological weapons, but with stronger verification
provisions .378 Negotiations ensued, but no agreement resulted.379
Despite the development of conventional restraint, the definition of individual national policy regarding CBWs, and the
United Nations focus on CBWs, there has been a greater use of
these weapons during the last several years than during any period since World War I. United States Department of State officials have characterized the use of CBWs in Asia by the Soviet
374. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 6, col. 3. For a brief history of the
BWC, see Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
10(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/2 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Special Report-2 (1978)].
375. The United States opposed the proposal. The Geneva Conference representative argued that there was a distinction between chemical and biological
agents: chemical agents were tactical or relatively controllable; biological agents
could directly threaten population centers. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 6, col.
3.
376. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 265.
377. See Ford, supra note 369, at 577 n.2. United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Director Dr. Fred C. IklS urged the Senate to consent to
ratification, noting that "the convention is entirely consistent with United
States policy concerning biological and toxin weapons.. . ." k16, Administration Urges Senate Approval of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological
Weapons Convention of 1972, id., 93, 94 (1975). Dr. Ikl6 identified the limited
verification provisions as the weakness of the BWC but stated that "it is in the
best interest of the United States to enter into this convention." Id. The Soviet
Union opposed provisions for on-site inspection and verification of compliance
procedures. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1972, at 3, coL 1. Dr. Ikl6 warned, however,
"that the limited verifiability of this convention should not be misconstrued as a
precedent for other arms limitation agreements. .. ." k16, supra, at 95. The
Senate unanimously consented to ratification, and President Ford signed the instrument of ratification on the same dates as the Geneva Protocol. See supra
note 368.
378. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1976, at 6, col. 1 (Geneva Disarmament Conference
of 1976).
379. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1979, at 8, col. 3. For a more complete discussion, see Special Report (1978), supra note 374, at 17-19; Special Report of the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 10(2) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2)
at 28-30, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/2 (1978).
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Union and its allies 380 as a violation of the Protocol, the BWC,
and customary international law.38 ' The recent violations have
weakened the customary rule, especially because there have been
limited efforts to investigate those violations and compel compliance with the rule. 2 Additionally, the emphasis upon policy, particularly by the United States, and upon the need for conventional restraint is actually evidence of a weak customary rule. The
Soviet Union and its allies not only deny using CBWs themselves,
they also deny that any CBWs have been used at all.3 s3 The fear
of some sanction, whether it be United Nations scrutiny or adverse political reaction, prevents the Soviet Union and its allies
from either confirming that lethal CBWs have been used or cooperating in an international inquiry. The Soviet fear may stem
from a desire to avoid stigma as a violator of the treaties that it
so strenuously supported. The fear also may originate from a recognition that, unlike the Soviet Union, the majority of states still
observe the customary rule of no first use which emerged from
World War II and has continued through the Korean and Vietnam conflicts to the present.
8.

Summary

Few states have expressed officially a conviction that a customary legal restraint inhibits CBW use. Instead, restraint has resulted from fear of retaliation, world scrutiny, and ostracism.
Nevertheless, no state has ever asserted a right of first use of lethal CBWs. Every state accused of using CBWs has either relied

380. See supra notes 1-2.
381. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
Defense Secretary Weinberger has characterized Soviet use of chemical weapons as a violation of the "no first use of chemical weapons" agreement. Moscow
A-Tests Questioned, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at 4, cbl. 5. At the same time,
however, President Reagan has announced a resumption of production of chemical weapons to meet the chemical weapons capability of the Soviet Union. See
TmE, Apr. 5, 1982, at 23. Congress, however, has impeded the President's plan.
See Stopping Poison Gas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at 16, col. 1 (noting congressional deletion of bill amendment which authorized the funds to produce
chemical weapons).
382. Indeed, Gary B. Crocker of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research warned that the use of chemical weapons may become acceptable if not met with an appropriate response now. Dunlap, U.S. Aide Warns
of Rising Chemical Warfare, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1982, at 48, col. 1.
383. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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upon a legal or semilegal justification or, more recently, has flatly
denied the charge. Thus, a customary, if unacclaimed, rule
against first use of CBWs presently exists, binding all belligerents
in all circumstances.
Determining the custom regarding the use of weapons causing
mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons, is complicated by the difficulty of ascertaining conviction. Because of widespread fear regarding the large scale use of
these weapons, states tend to act in a manner which taints any
evidence that normally would indicate the extent of their conviction. The tainted evidence has been typified by pronouncements
condemning the possession and use of these weapons made at the
same time that the pronouncing state is researching, developing,
stockpiling, preparing, or using these weapons. Even after a technologically capable state has ceased development and production
of a weapon, the state remains fearful of the absolute and horrifying devastation these weapons can cause in the hands of an enemy. Perhaps the special potential of these weapons for unlimited
destruction and the unique fear they evoke warrant an analysis to
ascertain customary law that requires less evidence of conviction
and relies more heavily upon objective indicators such as the
practice of abstention.
E. Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions are another source
before the ICJ.384 Although a judicial
only those parties to the decision, 8 5 it
or indirect source for the development

384.

"The Court. . . shall apply ...

of law applied to disputes
decision absolutely binds
may provide a subsidiary
of international law.3 86

subject to the provisions of Article 59,

judicial decisions ... as [a] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law," Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(d), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993, 1 U.N.T.S. at xvi, reprintedin BASIc

DOCUMENTS,

supra note

101, at 33-34.
385. Id., art. 59, reprinted at 37. "Precedents are not therefore binding in
international law .... " J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 64.
386.

1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 29.

[J]udges, statesmen, and lawyers dealing with questions of international
law inevitably give weight to the work of their predecessors and colleagues
. , * Decisions of the courts play an important part in the development
of customary law. They help to form international custom, and they show
what the courts, national or international, have accepted as international
law.
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Only a few judicial decisions have adjudicated the legality of
using CBWs. The decision cited most frequently is Kiriadolou v.
Germany,38 7 a 1930 decision by the German-Greek Mixed Arbitral Tribunal concerning the deaths of Greek nationals in a 1916
German conventional air bombardment of Bucharest. Many writers have focused on dictum in which the court applied the Hague
Regulation that requires warning prior to air bombardment of
population centers with poison bombs." s The tribunal stated:
"The dispensation from preliminary notification would enable
aeroplanes and dirigibles to poison the non-combatant population
of an enemy town by permitting them to drop, by night and without warning, bombs filled with asphyxiating gas, spreading death
and causing incurable diseases." ' s 9 Although this dictum has been
interpreted as a judicial condemnation of gas warfare, 390 the
meaning and significance of the opinion are uncertain.39 1
In The Hostage Case,3 92 a Nuremberg Tribunal case, a German
military commander was charged with exceeding the demands of
military necessity when he implemented a "scorched earth" policy in the Norwegian province of Finmark. 93 The commander orW. BISHOP, supra note 70, at 39. Judicial decisions are becoming an increasingly
important source of international law as more international matters are referred
to judicial bodies. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 64.

387. 10 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 100 (1921), 1929-30 Ann. Dig. 516 (No. 301), discussed in N. SINGH, supra note 103, at 186; KELLY, supra note 103, at 52; Neinast, supra note 20, at 37.
388. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 282.

389. Id. (quoting Kiriadobou v.Germany).
390. See Kelly, supra note 103, at 52.
391. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 282; Neinast, supra note
20, at 37. The following questions are raised by Neinast:
Were the "incurable diseases" mentioned in connection with the lingering
effects of gas, or was biological warfare the reference? Would "causing incurable diseases" have been allowed against non:combatants? Would
"causing incurable diseases" have been allowed against non-combatants
after a preliminary notification? Could incurable diseases be spread by
means other than bombardment? These questions were not answered by
the Tribunal.
Id. Major Neinast notes that the opinion was written five years after the signing
of the Geneva Protocol and that the Protocol may have had some influence on
the decision because Greece, Germany, and Rumania were parties at the time.
Id.
392. United States v. List, II TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MiL. TRi. 757 (1947-49) (Case No. 7., Mil. Trib. V).
393. Id. at 770-72 (Count Two, para. 9).
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dered all citizens evacuated and all buildings, residences, bridges,
communication and transportation facilities, livestock, and natural resources burned.3 9 4 The Tribunal found that military necessity justified the actions because the commander was seeking to
impede the advance of superior Russian forces. 95 It is possible,
however, that the Tribunal would not have found military necessity if the German commander had combined a "scorched earth"
policy with the use of chemical or biological weapons that rendered the land uninhabitable for long periods. 9
In the Tokyo War Crimes Trial 7 Japan was charged with using poison gas against China.39

The indictment alleged a viola-

tion of the Hague Gas Declaration, Hague Regulation article 23(a)
(the "no poison" rule), and article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles.3 9 The decision relied upon conventional prohibitions including those encompassed by the Treaty of Versailles, even
though the Treaty did not apply to Japan. This reliance indicates
the absence of conviction as to a customary rule.400 In December
1949, however, a Soviet military tribunal in Khaburovsk convicted twelve Japanese military officers of preparing and employing bacteriological agents, including typhoid, cholera, anthrax,
and plague, against the Mongolian People's Republic in 1939 and
against China from 1940 to 1942.401 Because Japan was not then a
party to the Geneva Protocol, the conviction may indicate Soviet
support for an independent customary rule against bacteriological
394. Id.

395. Id. at 1296-97.
396.

3

C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY

THE UNITED STATES 1808

(2d rev. ed. 1945).

397. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Nov. 1948) (official source unavailable),
reprinted in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029, 1033 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as L. FRIEDMAN]. "Count 55 charges the same

accused with having recklessly disregarded their legal duty by virtue of their
offices to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of
the laws and customs of war." Id.
398. Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, app. D, § 9, reprinted in O'Brien, supra
note 103, at 34 n.90.

399. Id.
400. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 283; see also O'Brien,
supra note 103, at 34 n.90 ("[The charge] appears to have been lost in the enormous number of counts and specifications.").
401. See M. GREENSPAN, supra note 103, at 358 n.148; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 103, at 343 n.2; Brungs, supra note 20, at 84 n.184; Neinast, supra note 20,
at 5 n.18; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 34 nn.89 & 90.
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warfare. 0 2 The significance of the judgment, however, is reduced
because the decision may have been determined more by political
considerations than by legal reasoning. 0 3
In The Shimoda Case,4 a case evaluating the legality, according to international law, of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, a Japanese national court briefly addressed the legality
of CBWs.4 0 5 The court found that the atomic bombings violated

international law because they caused disproportionate or "unnecessary suffering.

' 40 6

The court noted that poisonous gas and

bacteria were prohibited weapons, 07 compared these weapons to
402. See 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 283; O'Brien, supra note
103, at 34 n.90. This conclusion, however, is not consistent with the prevailing
Soviet preference for treaty law over customary law. See supra note 335.
403. Colonel Brungs notes that United States officials suspected at the time
that the charges were made to "obscure the fate of Japanese prisoners of war
still held then by the Russians." Brungs, supra note 19a, at 84 n.184. In 1950 the
Soviet Union proposed that an international military tribunal be appointed to
try several Japanese generals and the Emperor of Japan on similar charges, but
the proposal was never acted upon. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 343 n.2;
Brungs, supra note 20, at 84 n.185.
404. Ryuichi Shimoda v. State (1963) (official source unavailable), reprinted
in L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 397, at 1688-1702.
405. This case was an action by residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for
losses, injuries, and suffering due to the atomic bombing of those cities. The
plaintiffs sued the Japanese Government because the Government had waived,
in the 1951 Treaty of Peace, the right of Japanese citizens to make claims
against the United States. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 397, reprinted at 1688. The
court held that the individual plaintiffs were not entitled under international
law to claim damages and were precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from claiming damages under municipal law. Id., reprinted at 1689.
406. Id., reprinted at 1694. Rejecting the notion that total war removed any
distinction between military and nonmilitary objectives, the court, presuming
that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily population centers and not legitimate military targets, concluded that their destruction was militarily unnecessary. Id., reprintedat 1691-1694. The court stopped short, however, of forming a
per se rule on this basis when stating: "[I]t is not permissible to extend this
argument so as to prove that the atomic bomb must necessarily be prohibited
because it has characteristics different from other conventional weapons in the
inhumanity of its effects." Id.
407. Id., reprinted at 1695. Interestingly, the court had first attempted to
determine whether atomic bombing was prohibited by the Hague Gas Declaration, Hague Regulation article 23(a) (the "no poison or poisoned weapons" rule),
and the Geneva Protocol, all of which the court viewed as proscribing gas and
bacteria. Id. Recognizing a lack of agreement among international jurists when
comparing those materials with atomic bombs, the court implied that the former
materials are outlawed because they cause unnecessary suffering, and concluded
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atomic weapons, and concluded the latter must also be illegal because "the use of means of injuring the enemy which cause injury
at least as great or greater than these prohibited materials is prohibited by international law."'408 Thus, the court held the atomic
bombings violated international law because the acts themselves
violated the principle of military necessity. The court also seemed
to hold that the atomic bomb itself was illegal because its destructive power was inherently disproportionate.09 The opinion
makes the questionable assumption that CBWs are per se disproportionate and that atomic bombs are per se at least disproportionate.4 10 Although the opinion cites conventional restraints for
support, it does not mention any customary rules.4 "
These judicial decisions provide little guidance as statements of
the law, but each decision tends to recognize some conventional
or customary legal restraint. Moreover, because these cases encompass situations in which the defendant is alleged to have been
the first to use CBWs, the decisions may be viewed as contributing to the development of a customary restraint upon the first use
of CBWs.
F. Writings of Publicists
The last source of international law the ICJ may draw upon is
"the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations."412 These teachings, like judicial decisions, are a
"subsidiary means for determination of rules of law,"413 and serve
as "useful evidence" indicating what constitutes international
4
law.

41

that atomic bombs are illegal because they caused more unnecessary suffering
than poisonous gas.
408. Id.
409. For a full discussion of the Japanese court's analysis, see Falk, The
Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 774-76 (1965).
410. It is possible to use a chemical agent or a nonepidemic biological agent
with tactical and technical controls that render its use reasonably proportionate.
Conversely, an epidemic biological agent may ultimately cause more suffering
than any one nuclear weapon. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 407.
412. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(d), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993, reprinted in BASic DocuMENTs, supra note 101, at 34.
413. Id., reprinted at 33-34.
414. J. BRIERLY, supra note 24, at 65. "Such works are resorted to by judicial
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Many scholars have addressed the legal implications of manufacturing and using CBWs, and many authors agree that a universally binding customary rule exists prohibiting first use of chemical, but not biological, weapons. Several publicists argue that the
customary rule against the use of poisons or poisoned weapons, as
embodied in Hague Regulation article 23(a), 15 also prohibits the
use of CBWs. Dr. Schwarzenberger of the United Kingdom reasons that the Protocol's prohibitions are "merely declaratory of
international customary law,"41' and the Indian scholar Nagendra
Singh asserts that the Hague Resolution prohibits all chemical or
biological weapons. 17 Professors Greenspan and Tucker agree
that a customary rule exists,'1 and Tucker adds that the custom-

ary rule developed from the belief that poisonous gas and biological weapons cause unnecessary suffering." 9 Colonel Brungs includes biologically produced chemical poisons within the "no
poison" rule, but asserts that modern biological warfare is too recent a development to have been contemplated by the drafters of
article 23(a). 20
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (Gray, J.). But cf. 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 102, at 31 ("[W]ith the growth of international judicial activity and
of the practice of States evidenced by widely accessible records and reports, it is
natural that reliance on the authority of writers as evidence of International
Law should tend to diminish.").
415. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
416. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 147, at 201.
417. N. SINGH, supra note 103, at 153-54.
418. M. Greenspan, supra note 103, at 359.
419. H. KELSEN, supra note 166, at 117 (R. Tucker ed. 1966); R. TUCKER,
supra note 103, at 53. Professor Tucker cites treaties, drafts of treaties, and
wartime and peacetime pronouncements as examples of states' practice, evidencing a belief that CBW use is inhumane and forbidden. H. KELS.N, supra note
166, at 117. Professor Tucker implies that the practice of states points to a conviction that CBWs are inherently disproportionate, see id. at 116-17, an assertion with which Professors McDougal and Feliciano would disagree. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 103, at 632-40.
420. Brungs, supra note 20, at 58-59. While writing specifically on biological
warfare, Colonel Brungs states that large-scale biological reseaich is too recent
for the Geneva Protocol's bacteriological warfare prohibition to be declaratory of
custom. Id. at 90. Thus, the Geneva Protocol's biological prohibition operates
only between parties. Brungs notes that when the Geneva Protocol and the "no
poison" rule do not apply, the principle of military necessity may operate to
prohibit the use of biological weapons. Id. at 91.
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Another view is that the accumulated declarations and treaties
forbidding the use of poisons have become consolidated into a
customary prohibition against CBWs. Judge Lauterpacht, a British authority, believes that customary law and international
agreements form a general international legal prohibition of
chemical warfare.4 21 The Australian scholar Julius Stone agrees,

but believes that no rule prohibits the use of poisonous gas in
retaliation against a first use.422 The SIPRI writers argue that

adoption of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2162B (XXI), which calls for "strict observance by all States of
the principles and objectives of the [Geneva] Protocol," 423 demonstrates "acceptance by almost all states of the consolidation of the
'4 24
conventional prohibition of CBW into a rule of customary law.
Finally, Professor Bunn suggests that a customary rule proscribing first use of poison gas and "germ weapons" emerged from the
425
Geneva Protocol.
A third group of publicists, including Professors O'Brien and
Mallison assert that the first use of chemical weapons is prohibited by custom and convention, but that first use of biological6
42
weapons is prohibited only by convention, the Geneva Protocol.
Professors Thomas and Thomas hesitantly propose that a customary rule has emerged prohibiting first use of both chemical
and biological weapons.427
Finally, skeptics believe there is little or no customary or gen421. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 344 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952).
Judge Lauterpacht apparently believes that an insufficient accumulation of evidence constitutes a similar prohibition on bacteriological warfare and therefore
only the Protocol, operating between parties, prohibits it. Id. at 343.
422. J. STONE, supra note 61, at 556.
423. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2162B (XXI), reprinted in 3 SIPRI,
supra note 36, at 166-67.
424. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 24-25.
425. Bunn, supra note 40, at 387-88.
426. Mallison, supra note 103, at 328; O'Brien, supra note 103, at 59. Profes-

sor Mallison focuses on the juridical criteria that restrain weapons use which are
based upon the principle of military necessity. For instance, he asserts that the
illegal first use of a weapon may be "justified juridically" when used in propor-

tionate, legitimate reprisal. Mallison, supra note 103, at 328.
427. 2 THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 222, at 288. These writers warn that
evidence of this customary rule is "far from overwhelming." Id. They also note
that no rule exists that prohibits production or possession of CBWs. Id. at 292.
The writers conclude that international law regarding CBWs is in "a chaotic
state." Id.

19831

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

eral legal restraint upon CBWs other than conventional proscriptions. According to Professors McDougal and Feliciano and Major
Kelly, the principle of military necessity and its doctrine of proportionality are the only customary restraints upon the use of

CBWs. 428 The most skeptical writer, Major Neinast, concludes
that the Protocol parties' preparedness to wage biological warfare
indicates there is no customary legal restraint against biological
weapons. 429 Finally, Joseph Kunz suggests the only way to effectuate a "restriction or prohibition of chemical, bacteriological,
to which
and atomic" 4 0 weapons is by "international agreement
431
at least all militarily important states are parties."
A slight majority of publicists recognize a customary prohibition against chemical weapons, but a few limit the scope of the
rule to first use and permit reprisal in kind. Several writers claim
a similar rule applies to biological weapons but others believe
only conventional restraint exists for biological weapons. The fol-

lowing are the only conclusions that can be drawn with any confidence from the publicists:
(1) First use of chemical weapons is prohibited for all states by
custom;
(2) First use of biological weapons is prohibited for parties to the
Geneva Protocol;
428. Major Kelly concludes that custom prohibits using gas directly against
noncombatants, or against a legitimate military target if its use would cause disproportionate suffering or destruction. Kelly, supra note 103, at 64. Professors
McDougal and Feliciano, who use the phraseology "minimum destruction of values" in their treatment of the principle of military necessity and the doctrine of
proportionality, eschew the notion of per se customary rules. They observe that
there are many different types of biological agents, of varying effect and controllability, and some are very humane when compared with alternative conventional weapons. Thus, they adhere to a view that only conventions, such as the
Geneva Protocol, and military necessity and proportionality may operate as legal restraints upon CBWs. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELIciANO, supra note 103, at 5967, 632-40.
429. Neinast, supra note 20, at 32. Because of the many restrictive reservations to the Geneva Protocol, Major Neinast concludes that the Protocol is
"merely an agreement among the Contracting Powers not to be the first to use
biological weapons in a war involving Contracting Powers." Id.
430. Kunz, The New U.S. Army Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare,
51 AM. J. INT'L L. 388, 396 (1957).
431. Id. When this piece was written, about 45 states were parties to the
Protocol. See SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 111-15. Two important
military and industrial powers, the United States and Japan, were not yet parties. Perhaps this is at the heart of Dr. Kunz' despair.
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(3) Parties to the BWC are forbidden to use any biological weapons; and,
(4) Second use of chemical or biological weapons (reprisal) may be
limited by military necessity and proportionality.
The current validity of these conclusions is suspect, however, because the previously mentioned works were written at least nine
years ago,4 22 and several were written even earlier.
G.

Summary

When viewed together, sources of public international lawtreaties, customs, judicial decisions, and scholarly writings-often
reflect the acceptance of an international legal norm. Conventional restraints combine to prohibit first use of lethal or seriously
injurious chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol and the BWC
ban any use of lethal or seriously. injurious biological weapons;
this, coupled with an almost universal abhorrence of using disease
and sickness as a weapon seems to limit the practice of biological
warfare, and may indicate the acceptance of a new rule. At least
one writer, however, argues that biological warfare is too new for
development of a customary rule concerning its use.433
The scholars' commentaries and analyses support a rule against
first use of chemical weapons. If these same scholars were to reassess the state of the law today, they probably would perceive a
stronger legal restraint upon CBWs resulting from the increased
acceptance of the Protocol and the .promulgation of the BWC.
These scholars would conclude that international law disallows
first use of lethal or seriously injurious chemical and biological
weapons thus rendering clearly illegal the use of chemical and biological weapons in Asia.
The fundamental principles of the law of war apply independently of international legal norms. These principles are more
useful in specific instances of weapons use and contribute little to
the development of a general norm for specific weapons. They operate to determine the legality of using a weapon when that use is
not covered by a conventional or general legal restraint. 4 4 Be432. See F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51; 3 SIPRI, supra note 36.
433. See Brungs, supra note 20, at 75 ("Custom develops from practice, but
biological warfare in the present sense is simply too new for a pattern of practice
to have developed.").
434. Thus, a second use of biological weapons by a state not a party to the

BWC would be analyzed to determine whether it was necessary and
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cause the use of lethal and seriously injurious CBWs in Asia is
neither in self-defense nor reprisal, the principle of military necessity governs, and, conventional restraints aside, the use of
these weapons in Asia is clearly disproportionate.
IV.

THE MODERN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW

A.

Introduction

Having ascertained the extent to which general international
law restrains the particular parties in this hypothetical case from
using CBWs, it follows that a determination of the extent to
which these restraints apply to the instant conflicts is necessary.
The general international law of war is applicable in this case because the law governs conflicts not purely interstate, and because
emerging international humanitarian law applies to internal
conflicts.
B. The Modern Law of Armed Conflict
The international laws of war initially developed when wars
generally were declared and fought between states.3 5 The laws
were applied to disputes concerning different states and, in civil
wars, to insurgent groups qualifying as recognized belligerents.436
Armed conflicts in this century, particularly since World War II,
often have not met these traditional formal requirements. The
revolutionary or "liberation" character of these recent disputes
has made guerilla warfare "the pervasive mode of contemporary
conflict.

' 437

Nevertheless, these disputes generally have exhibited

some degree of international character and have resulted in extensive violence. 3 8 Consequently, the rules of war frequently are
proportionate.
435. See F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 9; see also Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders 100,
art. 20 (Apr. 24, 1863) ("Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments."), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note
27, at 6; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 202 ("War is contention between
two or more States through their armed forces . . . ."). See generally J. BOND,
THE RULES OF RIOT: INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE LAW OF WAR, 15-31 (1974).
436. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
437. J. BoND, supra note 435, at 33. See generally Kelly, A Legal Analysis of
the Changes in War, 13 MIL. L. REv. 89 (1961).
438. There have been significant civil wars in Spain, Korea, Yemen, Viet-
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recognized to apply in less formal and less purely international
armed conflicts. 5 9 Two principle reasons brought about this
recognition.
First, although international and internal armed conflicts "may
differ in some important respects,"4' 4 0 "they certainly hold in com-

mon other basic features which are inherent in the very idea of
armed conflict. 4 4 1 Thus, it is reasonable to apply law concerning
the use of weapons to both types of conflicts.4 42 The use of a
CBW prohibited by law would remain unlawful regardless of
whether the conflict is purely intrastate.
Second, the phenomenon of "internationalization" of internal
conflicts occurs when an insurgent group in a civil war achieves

nam, Laos, and Cambodia. Fritz Kalshoven suggests that "declarations of war
are practically out of fashion" because states wish to avoid being identified as
aggressors, because states seek to avoid the negative effect on relations with
other states caused by such declarations, and because they fear losing the element of surprise. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 10. Also, the "war may not be
a sudden affair at all but may develop imperceptibly out of a situation of slowly
increasing violence." Id.
439. For instance, states generally viewed the law of war as applicable to the
Spanish Civil War and the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts. See Cassese, The
Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed Conflicts, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-88 (A.
Cassese ed. 1975).
440. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 13. In international conflicts, the parties are of equal legal status. In a noninternational conflict, the parties, one of
whom is an insurgent group, do not start out as legal equals. The government is
defending its legitimacy as sovereign, and the insurgents are subject to the national law of treason or rebellion until the government or a third state accords
the insurgents recognition as a belligerent or government. Id.
441. Kalshoven, Applicability of Customary InternationalLaw in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267,
273 (A. Cassese ed. 1975). Common "basic features" in both types of conflict
include armed forces conducting hostilities with similar weapons and methods of
combat. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 13. Kalshoven comments,
[I]t would be very strange indeed if completely different codes of conduct,
or standards of civilization, would apply according as the conflict would
have to be classified as international or noninternational. This is all the
more so when account is taken of the increasing difficulty to determine
whether particular armed conflicts belong in one or the other category.
Kalshoven, supra, at 272.
442. 3 SIPRI, supra note 32, at 31. The reason for this proposition is that
rules relating to weapons are of a humanitarian nature and originate in "general
standards of civilization." Id.
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belligerency status, thereby equalizing the status of the parties 443
and triggering application of the rules of war. There is authority
that internationalization may occur even if the legitimate government or a third state never formally recognizes the belligerency.444 Internationalization of an essentially internal armed
struggle also may occur through intervention by one or more foreign states.44 5 A prime example is the Vietnam conflict,44 6 during

443. See supra note 440.
444. Cassese, supra note 439, at 287-88. Professor Cassese maintains that the
Spanish Civil War is an example of this phenomenon. Id. at 288. Cassese argues
the states had a general conviction that basic rules and principles of warfare
applied, although General Franco's group was never formally accorded belligerent status. Id. "According to the practice of States," id., a noninternational conflict must meet two primary requirements to fall within the basic rules of warfare: (1) The conflict must be large-scale-the insurgents are organized and in
control of a portion of the state's territory; and (2) the hostilities between the
insurgents and the legitimate government must "reach a considerable degree of
intensity and duration." Id. at 288. Conflicts not reaching this threshold do not
merit extension of international law. Id. According to Professor Cassese, the
Spanish Civil War met these criteria and was "regarded as a conflict belonging
to a tertium genus, intermediate between mere 'civil wars' and those civil wars
where the contending parties are recognized as belligerents." Id. at 291.
445. "Intervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of
things." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 103, at 272.
Kalshoven notes considerable opinion on whether intervention by a foreign
state has an internationalizing effect, and considerable disagreement on whether
this effect results from intervention on behalf of the government or intervention
on behalf of the insurgent group. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 15. A complete discussion of intervention and its effects is beyond the scope of this paper.
Professor Kalshoven would find internationalization when the intervention takes
the "form of direct and significant participation of foreign armed forces, as that
will incontestably deprive the armed conflict of its original character as a purely
intestine affair." Id. at 15. Professor Farer would find internationalization when
a foreign state has provided armed forces for either side, when the United Nations has entered an armed force, and possibly when a foreign state provides the
insurgent group with military arms and supplies. Farer, HumanitarianLaw and
Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of InternationalArmed Conflict, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 36, 72 (1971). Hans-Peter Gasser, head of the Legal Division of

the ICRC, discusses a category he terms "international non-international armed
conflict," defined as "a civil war characterized by the intervention of the armed
forces of a foreign power." Gasser, International Non-International Armed
Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon 31 Am. U.L.
REv. 911, 911 (1982).
446. The SIPRI writers characterize the Vietnam Conflict as one that is "international in character .

.

. without being exclusively inter-state." 3 SIPRI,
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which evidenced a belief that customary and conventional rules
should apply.447 The difficulty presented by the internationaliza-

tion approach is the subjectivity inherent in determining when an
armed conflict becomes "international in character.

'448

The alter-

native, however, is to exempt these conflicts from any application
of international legal principles. Given the prevalence of limited
armed cdnflicts in which foreign states are involved, directly or
indirectly, and in which the potential for large-scale violence and
destruction is present, this alternative is untenable. The laws of
war must be adapted to modern circumstances. Thus, the term
"law of armed conflict," is more appropriate because it applies to
a broader range of circumstances.
The conflict in Afghanistan is similar to the Vietnam conflict to
the extent that an outside nation intervened on behalf of governments it supported. The Soviet Union has committed substantial
military resources in Afghanistan and now faces organized guerilla opposition. Because of the nature of Soviet participation, the
rules of CBWs apply in Afghanistan. The conflicts in Kampuchea
and Laos, however, cannot be categorized so readily. In each
state, government forces seek to crush insurgent groups. Although
these groups may be too isolated and disorganized to internationalize the conflicts, the efforts of Vietnam and the Soviet Union to
help the governments of Kampuchea and Laos defeat the insurgents may lend sufficient "international
character" to the con4
flicts to invoke the rules of war.

C.

9

International Humanitarian Law

The emergence of an international humanitarian law can be
traced to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. 450 The purpose of
supra note 36, at 30.
447. Id. The Korean Conflict was similarly treated. See supra notes 328-29
and accompanying text.
448. F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 51, at 17.
449. The SIPRI writers suggest that customary prohibition of CBWs applies
to essentially internal conflicts. 3 SIPRI, supra note 36, at 31. But see Gasser,
supra note 445, at 917-21. Gasser notes that consent given by the new governments in Afghanistan and Kampuchea to foreign troop involvement in those
countries may vitiate any internationalization and make uncertain any application of the international law of armed conflict. Id.
450. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (HI) for the Amelioration of the Condition
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these instruments is to minimize the suffering of combatants
placed hors de combat by injury, illness, or capture, and to ensure
as much protection as possible for noncombatants. The significant
feature of the four 1949 Conventions is Common Article 3, which
places at least minimum humanitarian restraints on both parties
to "an armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. ' "51 Thus,
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (HI) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 13, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.S.T. 287. The four Conventions were the culmination of efforts to revise and
supplement the two 1929 Geneva Conventions (themselves the culmination of
attempts to revise and supplement earlier Geneva instruments dating from
1864). See SCHiNDLER & TomAN, supra note 27, passim.
451. E.g., Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318-19, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 136-39. Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provi-
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even the status of rebellion invokes the protection of some humanitarian rules. 52
An important development in international humanitarian law
occurred at the adoption of Protocol (II) Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 4 53 This instrument is intended "to supplement and develop Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. ' 454 One noted authority has interpreted the Protocol as an
instrument from which insurgents may derive rights and obliga''455
tions according to "their willingness to abide by its provisions.
Thus, the status of insurgents would be enhanced with respect to
sions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal
status of the Parties to the conflict.
Id. In addition, common article 2 prescribes application of the conventions to
situations besides formal, declared war:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it
in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.
Id., 65 U.S.T. at 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-37.
452. See generally Farer, supra note 445. Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Laos,
the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are all parties to the four 1949 Conventions. See
TREATMS IN FORCE, supra note 28, at 232-34.

453. J. BOND, supra note 435, at 209-29 (app. B) (draft of the Protocol), discussed in Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on
Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 30 ITr'L & Comp. L.Q. 416, 416-20 (1981).
The significance of the 1977 Protocol has been attributed in some degree to a
"consolidation" of the "Law of Geneva" with the "Law of the Hague"-the international law of armed conflict. Geraldson, What Is InternationalHumanitarian Law? The Role of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross: Introduction, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 817, 817-18 (1982). See generally Conference: The
American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference: International
HumanitarianLaw, id. at 805-977 (1982).
454. Cassese, supra note 453, at 417. Only states that are parties to the 1949
Conventions may sign and ratify, or accede to the 1977 Protocol. Id. at 418. As
of June 1980, ten states had ratified or acceded. Id. at 418 n.4. None of the
states involved in this hypothetical have ratified.
455. Id. at 428.
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their opposition governments and third states and, therefore, international law in general.456 Another authority suggested that
Protocol (II) "partly 'codified' and partly 'progressively develop[ed]'" international humanitarian law.45 7 Even states not
yet parties to the 1977 Protocol, therefore, would be bound by its
basic humanitarian rules. Thus, regardless if the conflicts in
Kampuchea and Laos are "international in character," Common
Article 3 affords the rebels protection. It is uncertain, however,
whether the utilization of CBWs violates article 3. The evidence
indicates that there is great suffering and horrible death following
the use of CBWs, but this fact alone does not amount to inhumane treatment without evidence of circumstances rendering the
particular use a violation of humanitarian law.
The Laotian government's use of CBWs on the Hmong tribe
exemplifies a circumstance indicating violation of humanitarian
law. The Laotian government has used CBWs on the Hmong
tribe in an extermination campaign launched because the tribe
sided with the United States during the Vietnam conflict. This
motive would violate the Genocide Convention of 1948458 as well
as fundamental principles of international law. According to the
Convention, "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group" 459 will constitute a crime. The Hmong clearly qualify as such a group. Consequently, the Laotian government, especially the military officials
responsible for the extermination attempts, and any Soviet or
Vietnamese officials involved have all violated humanitarian
law.460
International humanitarian law imposes legal constraints on
the conduct of belligerents even when traditional international
law does not apply, including conflicts characterized as exclu456. Id. at 429.
457. Kalshoven, supra note 441, at 268.
458. United Nations, Dec. 20, 1948, reprintedin 1 Tim LAW OF WAR,A DocUMENTARY HISTORY 692-96 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 1 L.
FRmDMAN].

459.

1 L.

FRIEDMAN, supra note

458, at 692 (art. 2).

460. The Convention provides that genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide are punishable. 1 L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 458, at 693 (art. 3). Persons charged with any punishable
act may be tried by "such international tribunal as may have jurisdiction with
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."

Id. (art. 6).
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sively internal. Certainly, the Genocide Convention applies to the
Hmong in Laos. Nevertheless, the international humanitarian law
of the Geneva Conventions probably does not make-the use of
CBWs in Asia per se illegal.
D. Summary
Because conflicts that are not purely interstate have become so
prevalent, the international law of war must now be applied to a
broader range of armed conflicts. The law of war, more appropriately termed the law of armed conflict, may be extended to the
conflicts in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos. This extension is
based first on the recognition that the first use of CBWs, prohibited in interstate conflicts by international law, is illegal in other
types of armed conflicts as well. The rationale behind the general
international legal prohibition forbidding the first use of CBWs is
equally compelling in an internal conflict as it is in an international conflict. Second, because the insurgent groups are identifiable and Soviet and Vietnamese armed forces are participating,
these conflicts have become internationalized and are appropriately governed by international law.
The emergence of international humanitarian law has accorded
international legal rights and obligations to insurgent groups, including those in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos. Even if the
conflicts in these states are internal, basic humanitarian principles protect the insurgent groups. It is doubtful, however, that
the mere use of CBWs, without further inhumane treatment, violates the basic protections afforded insurgents by international
humanitarian law. Nevertheless, efforts by Laos, Vietnam, and
the Soviet Union to exterminate the Hmong tribes in Laos violate
the Genocide Convention.
V.

CONCLUSION

A. Findings
In the instant hypothetical, the Soviet Union, Vietnam,
Kampuchea, and Laos were charged with violating international
law. Based on the foregoing analyses, the ICJ should make the
following disposition of the charges:
(1) The Soviet Union and Vietnam have not violated their obligations under the Geneva Protocol because the wording of the Protocol itself and the reservations of the two states require only that
the Soviet Union and Vietnam refrain from first use of CBWs
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against other states who are parties to the Protocol.461 Because the
insurgent groups are not parties, the Protocol's prohibitions do not
apply in the instant case.
(2) The Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Laos are violating the BWC,
to which they are nonreserving parties.462 Although the BWC prohibits possession of toxins for any nonpeaceful purpose, 4 3 these
nations not only possess but are using deadly toxins in Southeast
Asia. Kampuchea, only a signatory,4" has no legal obligation to follow the BWC and, therefore, is not violating the agreement.
(3) General international law prohibits first use of lethal or seriously injurious CBWs. 41 5 Because this international principle of restraint is binding on all states and governments, all of the accused
states, regardless of their treaty commitments, have violated this
international norm.
(4) Apart from general international legal prohibitions, the use of
CBWs contravenes the principle of military necessity. The utilization of CBWs against inferior insurgent forces clearly causes suffering disproportionate to the military advantages sought. Although
CBWs may satisfy controllability parameters, 466 the same military
advantage could be attained by use of alternative conventional
weaponry, and the
results would be closer to a "minimum destruc46 7
values.'
of
tion
(5) Although limited use of lethal or seriously injurious CBWs may
be lawful if used in cases of legitimate reprisal 8 or legitimate selfdefense,46 9 there is no evidence that either justification applies to
the conflicts at issue.
(6) The general international law of armed conflict prohibiting the
use of CBWs applies to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Kampuchea,
and Laos, even though they are not purely international in nature.
The rationale for weapons regulation-the need to reduce unnecessary suffering-is valid in any violent armed conflict. 470 Moreover,
the conflicts at issue have been internationalized by the involve471
ment of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

461. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
462. See supra text accompanying note 72.

463. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.

465. See supra text accompanying note 245.
466. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.

467. See supra note 117.
468. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 441-42 and accompanying text.

471. See supra notes 444-47 and accompanying text.

470

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16.387

B. Observations
Given the extent to which international law has been violated
during the conflicts at issue, particularly the flagrant violations of
the BWC toxin ban, a thorough international investigation of
CBW use in Asia is mandated. The violations of the BWC dramatically demonstrate that the Convention's failure to provide for
compliance verification or outside supervision 47 2 is fatal to its effectiveness. A similar treaty ban on chemical weapons should not
be promulgated unless it contains provisions ensuring rigid enforcement.' 73 The Soviet Union was involved in the promulgation
of the BWC 47 4 and has encouraged a similar ban on chemical

weapons. 47 5 The Soviet government, however, opposed inclusion
of provisions for on-site inspection and compliance verification
procedures in the BWC. 78
Recently, considerable attention has been given to the possibility of significant United States-Soviet negotiations to limit nuclear weapons.7 7 Considering the ample evidence of flagrant Soviet violations of existing international law, 7 8 the value of such
negotiations is questionable. For example, evidence indicates that
Soviet violations of the BWC date back to 1975, 47 the year the
Convention went into effect. 48 0 If there are nuclear weaponry ne-

472. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
473. The BWC's provision for a complaint mechanism is obviously inade-

quate. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Dr. Fred C. Ik16 had warned that the BWC's lack of verification procedure should not be considered a "precedent" for future
instruments. See supra note 377.
474. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
476. See supra note 377.
477. See, e.g., Thinking About the Unthinkable, TiME, Mar. 29, 1982, at 1026; First Things First, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1982, at 14, col. 1.
478. "Many people do indeed shy away from attempting to explain Moscow's

actions because the issue does strike at the heart of arms limitations talks." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 1982, at 22, col. 3 (Letter to -the Editor from Senator Dan
Quayle, Indiana).
479. See supra note 2.
480. See supra note 101. Indeed, the editors of the Wall Street Journal
forcefully comment:
A vital preliminary to further arms negotiations thus becomes a U.S.
demand that the Soviets answer our charges of past violations, specifically

the use of yellow rain. This demand must be pressed at the UN, at the
Helsinki Accord talks, in the existing arms negotiations and at a special
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gotiations, let us hope that the United States representatives
have learned the lesson taught at the cost of thousands of Afghan,
Kampuchean, and Laotian lives.
Lee David Klein

emergency meeting of the signatories of the 1972 Convention. It simply is
not responsible for American leaders to negotiate arms agreements when
there is such powerful evidence of Soviet disregard for past commitments.
First Things First,Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1982, at 14, col. 2.
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